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Editorial: On IJIE 
What is IJIE? 
IJIE is the journal of the International Center for 
Information Ethics (ICIE) and one step further in its 
successful evolving history. The ICIE started in 1999 
when a small group of friends and colleagues gave 
its founder, Rafael Capurro, their approval to build a 
network of experts in the field of information ethics. 
Martha Smith and Barbara Rockenbach formed the 
US connection at Yale University Library 
(http://www.library.yale.ed/icie). ICIE continued to 
grow as a virtual community receiving strong sup-
port for its technical implementation from the Center 
for Art and Media, Karlsruhe, Germany 
(http://www.zkm.de/). With the help of Thomas 
Hausmanninger (University of Augsburg, Germany) 
the regularly held ICIE symposia were started in 
2001. The proceedings were published at Fink 
Verlag Munich as an ICIE series. 
As we planned the International ICIE Symposium, 
taking place in October 4-6, 2004 and sponsored by 
the Volkswagen Stiftung 
(http://www.volkswagenstiftung.de/), the idea of an 
international online journal was born. We envisioned 
the possibility of making the papers of the Sympo-
sium broadly and freely available as well as creating 
a general forum for ongoing exchange of research 
and expertise in the field. Felix Weil (CEO of 
http://www.quibiq.de/) was an enthusiast of IJIE 
from the very beginning and offered management 
support in conjunction with the Center for Art and 
Media. Being that ICIE is international in scope we 
felt committed to the idea that contributions could 
be published multilingual (i.e. in English, German, 
French, Spanish or Portuguese). Many ICIE mem-
bers belong to these linguistic groups and thus 
appreciate to use IJIE as a platform for their local 
research communities instead of using English as 
the lingua franca. We hope that the policy of multi-
lingualism of IJIE will be recognized as a unique 
value-adding contribution of the journal to its field. 
Information Ethics 
Information ethics as understood in the context of 
this journal is concerned with ethical questions in 
the field of the digital production and reproduction 
of phenomena and processes including the ex-
change, combination and use of  information so 
produced or reproduced. Maintaining a broad focus 
on these issues, IJIE is particularly devoted to 
ethical questions of all kinds of digital devices 
whether through their coding methods or their local 
or global content and the social interactions that 
produced them, i.e., to what has been called the 
“infosphere” (L. Floridi). 
Scope 
IJIE is not primarily a philosophical journal. It is 
interdisciplinary as the subject itself yet taking the 
ethical point of view on it. The topics are supposed 
to be relevant not only to theoreticians but also to 
practitioners from a diversity of fields such as inter-
net research and practice, media studies, computer 
science, economics, politics, philosophy, sociology 
and psychology. Nevertheless, the journal is not 
devoted to questions of professional ethics in par-
ticular. Contributions should rather focus on critical 
thinking about the conflicts, threats and opportuni-
ties in the field of information ethics, the change of 
norms and values, the creation of power structures, 
information visions and myths as well as hidden 
contradictions and intentionalities in information 
theories and practices. Contributors with different 
philosophical and scientific backgrounds are wel-
come provided that they do not pursue an ideologi-
cal or proselytising agenda and that a standard of 
excellence in ethical reasoning and scientific meth-
odology is observed. We agreed on setting high 
standards and keeping them up by a rigorous peer-
to-peer reviewing procedure. Thus we are proud on 
having gained prominent experts in the field as our 
editorial advisory board. For all details on submitting 
contributions, the reviewing process and publication 
conditions see www.ijie.org. IJIE is also designed to 
be a platform for intercultural exchange. It intends 
to provide reports about local experiences that may 
be of interest to other settings or to the global 
community. 
Issues 
The information field is a quickly changing field. 
Today’s information societies are characterized by a 
plurality of paradigms that have their sources in a 
variety of cultural traditions and technological devel-
opments. Ubiquitous computing and nanotechnology 
may have a profounder social impact in the near 
future than the internet revolution ten years ago. 
Who will be the beneficiaries and who the losers? 
With which criteria will we think about the liaison 
between information technology and biotechnology? 
Orwell’s fear, the fear of surveillance, may become 
the dominating mood of the information society, 
particularly after September 11, 2001 and March 11, 
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2004, instead of trust and information solidarity. The 
latter would give our planet and its inhabitants not 
only an opportunity of survival but also an occasion 
for good life (eu zen), which is, indeed, the main 
concern of ethics from the time of its founder, 
Aristotle. 
Volume 1 
Introduction is the theme woven into our first issue: 
introduction into the subject, the agents and the 
ambience. In his "Position Paper" Rafael Capurro 
introduces into the state of the discussion on 
information ethics in Germany. Following 
Wittgenstein (where Wittgenstein never would have 
gone himself), Felix Weil wants to introduce with his 
contribution the notion of 'use' into ethics – into 
information ethics in particular. Thomas 
Hausmanninger asks the question "Controlling the 
Net: Pragmatic Action or Ethics Needed?" and 
argues to take the ethical approach to the problems 
concerned. Thus having introduced ourselves we 
comply with our standards set for the journal and 
invite for the international discourse within IJIE: 
Shifra Baruchson from Israel elaborates on the 
relationship of "Printed Versus Internet Plagiarism" 
and proves that information is not equal to 
information but strongly depends on its media. 
Tadashi Takenouchi from Tokyo University in Japan 
familiarizes with Rafael "Capurro's Hermeneutic 
Approach to Information Ethics" and finds some 
interesting interactions with Japanese thought 
patterns. 
Perspectives 
The following volume 2 is to be published by August 
2004. It will be dedicated completely to the papers 
submitted to the ICIE Symposium 
(http://icie.zkm.de/congress2004) held 4-6 October 
2004 in Karlsruhe on "Localizing the Internet: Ethical 
Issues in Intercultural Perspective" 
We hope that all ICIE members, contributors and 
readers of this journal will appreciate the IJIE as a 
tool for their research and/or practice. We will do 
our best to enhance this platform continuously by 
providing new features supporting the journal’s 
objectives. Any ideas or suggestions for improve-
ment are highly welcome.  
Yours, 
Rafael Capurro (Editor in Chief), 
Thomas Hausmanninger and Felix Weil 
June 2004 
IJIE 
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Rafael Capurro 
Informationsethik – Eine Standortbestimmung 
Abstract: 
Title: Information Ethics – A Position Paper 
The paper describes some of the main ethical challenges of information society as currently discussed within 
the framework of the World Summit on the Information Society. It addresses the question of ‘what is infor-
mation ethics?’ under a twofold perspective. In a large sense information ethics is said to deal with ethical 
questions related to all kinds of digital phenomena including all non-digital but digitalized or digitalizable 
phenomena. In a narrower sense information ethics deals with ethical questions of human communication 
within a digital environment. A non-metaphysical foundation of information ethics in the narrower sense 
(‘nethics’ or Internet ethics) is given.  Curricula targets are briefly outlined. 
Agenda 
Einführung 
Themen der aktuellen Diskussion um die Wissensgesellschaft 
„Charta der Bürgerrechte für eine nachhaltige Wissensgesellschaft„ 
Ansätze zur Informationsethik 
Author: 
Prof. Dr. Rafael Capurro: 
• Hochschule der Medien (HdM) University of Applied Science, Wolframstr. 32, 70191 Stuttgart, Ger-
many 
•  + 49 - 721 - 98 22 9 22 ,  capurro@hdm-stuttgart.de,  www.capurro.de 
• Relevant publications: 
- Ethik im Netz. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 2003, 278 p. 
- Netzethik. Grundlegungsfragen der Internetethik, Thomas Hausmanninger, R. Capurro, (Ed.) 
Schriftenreihe des ICIE Bd. 1, München: Fink 2002, 206 p. 
- Leben im Informationszeitalter. Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1995, 134 p.  
- Hermeneutik der Fachinformation. Freiburg/München: Alber Verlag 1986,  239 p.  
- Informationsethik. R. Capurro, Klaus Wiegerling, Andreas Brellochs, (Ed.). Konstanz: Univer-
sitätsverlag Konstanz (UVK) 1995, 308 p.  
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Einführung 
Der Begriff Informationsethik reicht vermutlich bis in 
die frühen 1980er Jahre zurück, als der Computer 
im bibliografischen Bereich sich allmählich 
durchsetzte und sich neue Fragen vor allem in 
Bezug auf den online Zugang zu wissenschaftlichen 
Dokumenten und ihren Surrogaten (abstracts) 
stellten.1 Die ersten internationalen Datenbanken 
und Informationssysteme, wie zum Beispiel INIS 
(International Nuclear Information System) der 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), gehen 
auf die 1970er Jahre zurück. Joseph Weizenbaums 
„Computer Power and Human Reason“ erschien 
1976. 
Als Mitte der 1990er Jahre das Internet entstand, 
weitete sich die Bedeutung auf dieses Medium aus 
und es gab konkurrierende Bezeichnungen, wie zum 
Beispiel Cyberethik. Dies geschah zunächst nicht nur 
in Abgrenzung zu den ethischen Fragen im Biblio-
thekswesen (Bibliotheksethik) in der Informatik 
(Computerethik), sondern vor allem in Bezug auf 
den Bereich der Massenmedien (Medienethik), 
wobei der Ausdruck ‚Medienethik’ inzwische auch 
umfassender gebraucht wird.2 
Im weiteren Sinne umfasst Informationsethik Fragen 
der Digitalisierung, d.h. der Rekonstruktion aller 
möglichen Phänomene im Medium von 0 und 1 als 
digitale Information sowie des Austauschs, der 
Kombination und der Verwertung dieser Information 
im Medium digital vermittelter Kommunikation. Die 
Verschwommenheit dieses Begriffs von Information-
sethik ist der Umfassendheit der Digitalisierung 
geschuldet, ihrem Sog, alles in sich aufzusaugen 
und als seiend nur noch gelten zu lassen, was 
digitalisierbar ist. Ich spreche in diesem Zusammen-
hang von einer digitalen Ontologie.3  
Im Rahmen dieses Verständnisses von Information-
sethik hat das International Center for Information 
Ethics (ICIE) zunächst einen Schwerpunkt in seiner 
Arbeit gesetzt, nämlich die Auseinandersetzung mit 
dem Internet (Netzethik) und der digital vermittelten 
                                               
1 Rafael Capurro: Hermeneutik der Fachinformation. 
2 Klaus Wiegerlin: Medienethik. 
3 Rafael Capurro: Beiträge zu einer digitalen Ontolo-
gie. 
Kommunikation.4 Diese Schwerpunktsetzung ist 
pragmatisch: Informationsethik muss mit einem der 
möglichen Gegenstände beginnen und das Netz 
stellt hierbei zweifelsohne eine der neuartigsten 
Herausforderungen dar. Das lässt sich am Beispiel 
der aktuellen Diskussion um die Wissensgesellschaft 
zeigen. 
Themen der aktuellen Diskussion 
um die Wissensgesellschaft 
Auf der praktischen Ebene hat das Nachdenken 
darüber, was der Anruf der Freiheit in der kategori-
alen Gestalt des Netzes verspricht, längst begonnen. 
Nach den konkreten Ausformungen von Informa-
tionsfreiheit zu fragen, heißt, auf die Ungerechtig-
keiten in der realen Welt zu achten, nicht zuletzt, 
indem wir uns fragen, was sollen und können wir im 
Netz und mittels des Netzes tun, um eine Welt zu 
gestalten, die ökonomisch, militärisch, politisch, 
technisch, moralisch, religiös... zumindest weniger 
gewaltsam wird.  
Welche sind die Topthemen in der aktuellen Diskus-
sion um die digitale Weltverneztung? Ich nehme als 
Beispiel die Website www.gipfelthemen.de, die von 
polit-digital e.V. und der Deutschen Gesellschaft für 
die Vereinten Nationen mit Unterstützung vom 
Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenar-
beit betreut wird. Die Themenliste umfasst folgende 
Rubriken, deren Erläuterungen hier abgekürzt 
wiedergegeben sind:  
1. Digitale Spaltung: Wer von "Digitaler Spaltung" 
redet, redet immer auch über fehlende technische 
Infrastruktur. Die Frage ist, ob und inwiefern die 
Informationstechnik (allein) zur Überwindung der 
digitalen Spaltung beiträgt.  
2. Medien & Kompetenz: Ein Computer allein 
reicht nicht mehr. Auf die kompetente Bedienung 
kommt es an. Die Frage lautet dann, wie die Ver-
mittlung von Medienkompetenz bei der Über-
windung des digitalen Grabens helfen kann.   
3. Inhalte & Vorbilder: Auf die Inhalte kommt es 
an. Was ist aber ein guter Inhalt? Wo kann das 
Internet Mehrwert sein? Und wo ein Vorbild?  
                                               
4 Thomas Hausmanninger, Rafael Capurro: Einlei-
tung: Eine Schriftenreihe stellt sich vor. 10 
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4. Wissen & Besitz: Im Internet türmen sich Berge 
von Informationen. Doch wem gehören Sie? 
Unternehmen, der Allgemeinheit oder gar dem 
Staat? Wie steht es um die Kommerzialisierung von 
Wissen?  
5. Multi & Kulti: Das Internet steht für Vielfalt in 
einer globalisierten Welt. Es ist die Frage, ob es 
diesem Anspruch auch gerecht wird. Gibt das Netz 
kulturelle Vielfalt wieder oder dominiert eine Kultur 
alle anderen?  
6. Beteiligung & Spielregeln: Um die neuen 
Medien zu nutzen, um damit Bürgerbeteiligung und 
Gemeinwesen zu stärken, braucht es Regeln und 
Gesetze. Die Diskussion rund ums eGovernment und 
eDemocracy ist voll im Gange.   
7. Piraten & Terroristen: Wie gefährlich ist Cy-
berkriminalität? Ist eine Kriminalisierung von Hack-
ern und Raubkopierern gerechtfertigt oder wird mit 
Bedrohungsszenarien übertrieben?    
8. Daten & Schutz: Ist das Sicherheitsbedürfnis 
von Einzelpersonen real, die wahre Bedrohung aber 
nur virtuell? Wie sollten und können die individuellen 
Rechte geschützt werden?  Wie viel Daten müssen  
z.B. Provider speichern, was den Sicherheitsbe-
hörden melden?    
9. UNO und Info-Gesellschaft: Wie kann die 
UNO den Wandel hin zu einer Wissens - und Infor-
mationsgesellschaft mitgestalten und welche Posi-
tionen hat sie dabei bislang eingenommen? 
Vordringliches Ziel des World Summit on the Infor-
mation Society (WSIS) ist es, allen Menschen 
gleichberechtigten Zugang zu Wissen zu er-
möglichen, so der Generalsekretär der Vereinten 
Nationen, Kofi Annan.  
Diese Fragen weisen auf Chancen und Gefahren der 
globalen Vernetzung hin. Sie stellen eine zugleich 
politische und ethische Herausforderung dar. Ver-
schiedene insbesondere zivile Organisationen 
bemühen sich um Lösungsvorschläge bezüglich der 
ethischen und juristischen Rahmenbedingungen 
einer gerechte(re)n Weltinformations- und Kommu-
nikationsordnung zum Beispiel in Form eines Werte-
katalogs, der als Orientierung politischen Handelns 
sowie rechtlicher Normierung dienen soll. 
„Charta der Bürgerrechte für eine nachhaltige 
Wissensgesellschaft„ 
Ein Beispiel eines solchen Wertekatalogs ist die 
"Charta der Bürgerrechte für eine nachhaltige Wis-
sensgesellschaft", ein kollaboratives Werk zivilgesell-
schaftlicher Akteure, insbesondere der Heinrich Böll 
Stiftung, die damit ein Diskussionsangebot zum UN-
Weltgipfel zur Informationsgesellschaft unterbreiten 
wollen.  
"Die Ausgangsthese ist", so Olga Drossou, Referen-
tin für Medienpolitik und Neue Medien der Heinrich 
Böll Stiftung in Berlin,  
"dass die Digitalisierung einen erheblichen 
Neuordnungsbedarf im Hinblick auf den Umgang 
mit Wissen hervorruft. Aus unserer Sicht wird 
die Auseinandersetzung hierzulande, aber auch 
weltweit, sehr stark durch die 
Bestandsinteressen der Informationswirtschaft 
und der Verwertungsindustrie geprägt. Das 
herrschende Problembewusstsein erschöpft sich 
in Begriffen wie Raubkopien und geistiger 
Enteignung. Wir meinen dagegen, dass es bei 
der Gestaltung der künftigen Wissensordnung 
mehr zu bedenken gibt als die Absatzprobleme 
einzelner Branchen. Aus unserer Sicht geht es 
um nichts Geringeres als die Konzeption einer 
nachhaltigen Wissensgesellschaft, die auch für 
die künftigen Generationen das Wissen der 
Vergangenheit zugänglich vorhält. Nur durch 
den ungehinderten Zugang zu Wissen können 
die kreativen Potenziale erschlossen und soziale 
und wirtschaftliche Erfindungen gefördert 
werden, die für die Zukunft unserer Gesellschaft 
und ihrer Verantwortung für globale 
Nachhaltigkeit erforderlich sein werden." 5 
Die ethischen Werte die nach dieser "Charta" zu 
bewahren und zu fördern gilt, lauten in Kurzform:  
1. Wissen ist Erbe und Besitz der Menschheit und 
damit frei  
2. Der Zugriff auf Wissen muss frei sein  
3. Die Verringerung der digitalen Spaltung muss als 
Politikziel hoher Priorität anerkannt werden  
4. Alle Menschen haben das Recht auf Zugang zu 
den Dokumenten öffentlicher und öffentlich kontrol-
lierter Stellen  
                                               
5 Olga Drossou: Die „Charta der Bürgerrechte für 
eine nachhaltige Wissensgesellschaft“ und der 
Weltgipfel zur Informationsgesellschaft (WSIS) 
2003. 
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5. Die ArbeitnehmerInnenrechte müssen auch in der 
elektronisch vernetzten Arbeitswelt gewährleistet 
und weiterentwickelt werden  
6. Kulturelle Vielfalt ist Bedingung für individuelle 
und nachhaltige gesellschaftliche Entwicklung  
7. Mediale Vielfalt und das Angebot von Information 
aus unabhängigen Quellen sind unerlässlich für den 
Erhalt einer aufgeklärten Öffentlichkeit  
8. Offene technische Standards und offene Formen 
der technischen Produktion garantieren die freie 
Entwicklung der Infrastrukturen und somit eine 
selbstbestimmte und freie Kommunikation  
9. Das Recht auf Achtung der Privatheit ist ein 
Menschenrecht und ist unabdingbar für die freie und 
selbstbestimmte Entfaltung von Menschen in der 
Wissensgesellschaft.  
Diese knappen Hinweise auf brisante Diskussion-
sthemen der Wissensgesellschaft unter einer 
ethischen Perspektive machen aber deutlich, dass 
hier nicht nur eine politische, sondern eine kulturelle 
und letztlich auch eine philosophische Herausfor-
derung ersten Ranges vorliegt, die mit Diskussionen 
in Online-Foren oder mit der Erstellung von Werte-
katalogen nicht erschöpft ist. Sie verlangt vielmehr 
einen langfristigen interdisziplinären und interkul-
turellen Dialog, der nicht zuletzt sich des Mediums 
bedient, das er zugleich problematisieren soll.6 
Ein solcher Dialog kann wiederum selbst als ethisch 
bezeichnet werden, sofern nämlich damit nicht nur 
eine intellektuelle Tätigkeit der Reflexion über Moral 
und insbesondere der Moralbegründung, sondern 
eine gestaltende Kraft gegeben ist, die sich aber 
keinesfalls einbildet, aus der hohen Warte der Moral, 
anderen zu diktieren, wie sie im Netz oder ohne das 
Netz zu denken und zu handeln haben. 
Ansätze zur Informationsethik 
Es ist eine Stärke und kein Manko der Ethik, dass sie 
sich auf unterschiedliche Denkansätze berufen kann. 
Diese Vielfalt schützt uns vor fundamentalistischen 
Verkürzungen und entlässt uns keineswegs aus der 
Verantwortung im jeweiligen Fall zu berücksichtigen, 
was genau zum Beispiel unter Menschenwürde zu 
verstehen ist und wie diese in Bezug auf unser 
                                               
6 Charta der Charta der Bürgerrechte für eine nach-
haltige Wissensgesellschaft. 
Informationshandeln gegebenenfalls (besser) zu 
schützen wäre.   
In der heutigen ethischen Diskussion ist es beinah 
Mode geworden, utilitarische und deontologische 
Ansätze als unvereinbare Gegensätze darzustellen 
und sie manchmal sogar mit geographischen 
Einteilungen diesseits und jenseits des Atlantik oder, 
innerhalb Europas, diesseits und jenseits des Ärmel-
kanals zu identifizieren. Im Unterschied zu solchen 
Verkürzungen sehen wir die lebendige Einbeziehung 
ethischer Ansätze unterschiedlicher philosophischer 
Provenienz, sowie aus anderen Kulturen und Ep-
ochen, als ein pharmakon gegen einseitiges Denken 
und Handeln.   
Menschliches Denken und Handeln finden immer im 
Kontext kontingenter Situationen statt, was nicht 
heißt, dass wir einem unentrinnbaren Schicksal 
ausgeliefert wären. Vielmehr bildet diese Einsicht die 
Voraussetzung dafür, dass wir die digitale Weltver-
netzung nicht verabsolutieren. Wir denken und 
leben in kontingenten Netzen. Das ist unsere 
Grundbefindlichkeit.   
Thomas Hausmanninger sieht im Anschluß an Über-
legungen von Hans Blumenberg die ersten Wurzeln 
dieser Kontingenzerfahrung schon in der nominal-
istische Verunsicherung nach der Hochscholastik, 
wodurch die göttliche Garantie für die Vernünftigkeit 
der Welt zerbricht.7 Mit den Umbrüchen zu Neuzeit 
und Moderne, die sich daran anschließen, wird diese 
Wende zur Kontingenz vollendet: Pluralisierung und 
Entsubstantialisierung der Subjektvorstellung und 
die Heraufkunft eines nachmetaphysischen Zeitalters 
benennen schlagwortartig unsere Zeitsituation. Die 
Relativierung und Kontingentierung der Vernunft, 
die dabei geschieht, die Endlichkeit und Pluralität 
des Vernünftigen, erscheint jetzt, im Information-
szeitalter, in der Erfahrung der digitalen Vernetzung, 
der unterschiedliche Formen technischer Netzwerke 
vor allem im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert vorausgin-
gen.   
Pluralisierung und Relativierung bedeuten aber 
keineswegs Beliebigkeit und Relativismus. Haus-
manninger weist in Anschluß an Kant mit Recht 
darauf hin, dass Freiheit "nicht aus sich selbst 
bestehen (bleiben) kann, sondern als reale eröffnet, 
durch Grenzziehungen offengehalten werden muss. 
                                               
7 Thomas Hausmanninger, Rafael Capurro: Ethik in 
der Gobalität. Ein Dialog. 13-14. 
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Hierfür ist zunächst einmal die Ethik zuständig (als 
Basis auch des Rechts)".8 
Wenn wir in diesem Rahmen Informationsethik zu 
betreiben versuchen, sind wir uns zunächst darin 
einig, dass das erste Verbindende die Frage selbst 
ist: Wir treffen uns in der plural-dezentrierten Zeit-
situation und in der globalisierten Welt zuallererst in 
der Frage nach einer Orientierungsbasis. Sie erlaubt 
es uns, mitten in den constraints der real-politischen 
Auseinandersetzung, vor allem aber mitten in der 
real-sozialen Wahrnehmung dessen, was uner-
träglich ist, und was keinen Aufschub erduldet, doch 
Zeit und Raum zu finden, um uns auf die Differen-
zen einzulassen, sie in uns, individuell und sozial, 
zuzulassen.   
Eben dieses Zulassen der Orientierungsfrage, ist 
bereits ein Teil jener nicht-substanziellen Orien-
tierungsbasis, die wir, bei allen Differenzen, gemein-
sam suchen. In der Sprache der Tradition würden 
wir sagen, dass wir im Kontext der Information-
sethik nach Möglichkeiten der Verwirklichung 
menschlicher Freiheit unter den kategorialen Bedin-
gungen der Weltvernetzung fragen. Der Ausdruck 
"nicht-substantielle Orientierungsbasis" ist dabei in 
einem gewissen Sinne ein Oxymoron, sofern nämlich 
mit Basis etwas Festes angedeutet wird, während in 
Wahrheit die digitale Weltvernetzung uns mit einer 
zugleich kollektiven und kontingenten Form von 
Freiheit, Geschichte und Subjektivität konfrontiert, 
also mit Dynamik und Vielfalt sowie mit einem 
Wegbrechen der traditionellen Festigkeiten, deren 
Tragweite wir heute kaum ermessen können.   
Diese Situation fordert auch von EthikerInnen eine 
Offenheit, die Wagnischarakter hat. Interessanter-
weise ist es ein Theologe, der schon 1965 solche 
Offenheit als Erfordernis für die Ethik in der Mod-
erne einfordert. Gegenüber der Moral, die an der 
Verteidigung von bestimmten Gestalten interessiert 
ist, muss die Ethik, so Karl Rahner in einem 
berühmten Vortrag mit dem Titel "Experiment 
Mensch", sich dem schmerzhaften Wagnis der 
Freiheit stellen.9 Ich glaube, dass das Internet Teil 
dieses Freiheitswagnisses ist. 
Wenn das ‚Wesen’ (verbal gedacht) des Menschen in 
der Möglichkeit der (Selbst-) Manipulation besteht, 
dann ist die Frage nach dem Woraufhin offen und 
                                               
8 Thomas Hausmanninger, Rafael Capurro: Ethik in 
der Globalität. Ein Dialog. 18 
9 Karl Rahner: Experiment Mensch. 
lässt sich nicht von einem konkreten Zustand her 
moralisch legitimieren und beantworten. Im Unter-
schied zum Moralisten ("Der Mensch darf und soll 
nicht alles tun, was er kann") und zum nüchternen 
Skeptiker ("Es ist nicht zu erwarten, dass der 
Mensch unterlassen wird, was er tun kann") schreibt 
Rahner:  
"Das absolute, absolut durchschaute System, 
das reibungslos funktioniert, könnte per 
definitionem nur von einem gebaut werden, der 
selbst schlechthin außerhalb seiner steht; auch 
die lernende und sich selbst adaptierende 
Maschine kann, solange sie mit dem Universum 
nicht identisch ist, dies nur innerhalb eines 
endlichen Bereiches." 10 
Sich zum Wagnis der Freiheit zu bekennen, bedeutet 
aber nicht, Ambivalenzen zu verkennen. So ist zum 
Beispiel im industriellen und post-industriellen 
Zeitalter der Netzbegriff vorwiegend positiv belegt, 
während er in der Agrargesellschaft stärker zwi-
espältige Konnotationen besaß. Die Sprache be-
wahrt Spuren dieser Ambivalenz, zum Beispiel in 
den Ausdrücken "den Faden verlieren", "sich in den 
Netzen verfangen", sowie in Worten wie "Liebes-
netze" und "Fangnetze". Die Ambivalenz bleibt auch 
für die digitalen Netze bestehen: Bei aller Anerken-
nung um die Vorteile der digitalen Vernetzung 
sollten wir uns zugleich immer bewußter werden, 
dass, wenn wir eine Orwellsche surveillance society 
vermeiden wollen, gerade auf die Lücken des Netzes 
angewiesen sind. Je engmaschiger die Netze, um so 
schwieriger ist es auch, im informationstechnischen 
Labyrinth zwar nicht den einen wohl aber einen 
Ariadnefaden zu finden, den wir aber immer mit 
anderen Fäden selbst verknüpfen müssen.11 Die 
Maschen, die wir dabei stricken und in denen wir 
uns volens nolens verstricken, sind unser Leben 
selbst. Denn wir sind immer schon als Natur- und 
Kulturwesen vernetzt, im Netz des Lebens, das heißt 
der Natur und der Sprache.  
Den Begriff der Netzethik, die wir uns in den kontin-
genten Netzen von Lebenswelt, Kultur und Digitalität 
zur Aufgabe gemacht haben, können wir dabei im 
Sinne eines genitivus objectivus und subjectivus 
verstehen. In der ersten Bedeutung meinen wir die 
Kritik an einer Ausformung unseres digitalen Seins, 
die von den realen Nöten der Menschen absieht, 
anstatt zu fragen, inwiefern das Netz bestehende 
                                               
10 Karl Rahner: Experiment Mensch. 66. 
11 Rafael Capurro: Ethik im Netz. 48-50. 
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Ungerechtigkeiten zementiert und sogar vertieft 
oder, positiv ausgedrückt, inwiefern die Globalis-
ierung den Menschen konkrete Chancen bietet, sich 
in einer pluralen und komplexen Welt ein nach ihren 
eigenen Vorstellungen und Wünschen besseres 
Leben zu gestalten. Diese Problematik wird heute 
vor allem unter dem Stichwort digital divide thema-
tisiert. Wir können auch von digitaler Apartheid 
sprechen. 
Die zweite Bedeutung bezieht sich auf die Art und 
Weise wie wir im Netz sind. Hier sehe ich die 
Chance für eine Netzethik im Rahmen einer Philoso-
phie der Lebenskunst. Wenn Wilhelm Schmid auf die 
"Gefahr einer bloßen Unterwerfung des Selbst unter 
die technologischen Bedingungen" aufmerksam 
macht,12 dann ist zu fragen, inwiefern dabei die 
Unterscheidung zwischen den Massenmedien und 
dem Internet ausfällt, die den entscheidenden 
Unterschied zwischen der Massenkultur des 20. 
Jahrhunderts und der neuen vernetzten und interak-
tiven Kommunikationskultur in diesem zweifellos 
nicht undramatisch beginnenden 21. Jahrhundert 
ausmacht. 
Wenn Misstrauen eher Gelassenheit am Platz ist, 
dann vor allem in Bezug auf jene Schleusenwärter 
der Information, die mittels einer hierarchischen 
one-to-many Struktur, eine Masse durch eine uni-
versal ausgerichtete Botschaft neuerdings auch 
durch das Internet zu erreichen und ihre Aufmerk-
samkeit zu fesseln versuchen. Wir können diese 
Gefahr als das CNN-Effekt bezeichnen. Das Subjekt 
ist aber ein historisches Gebilde, als face-to-face 
Diskutierender, Leser, Zuschauer oder Zuhörer von 
massenmedialen Botschafen und -- als Sender und 
Empfänger im digitalen Netz. Die moralischen und 
rechtlichen Bedingungen der Massenmedien lassen 
sich nicht eins zu eins auf das Internet übertragen, 
ohne damit die Chancen dieses Mediums für eine 
neue Form der Ausgestaltung unserer Freiheit aus 
dem Blick zu verlieren. Das heißt wiederum nicht, 
dass im Internet keine rechtlichen und moralischen 
Normen notwendig wären. Es ist gerade die Haup-
taufgabe einer Informationsethik zur Bildung eines 
Cyberethos beizutragen, von dem aus sich rechtliche 
Normen herauskristallisieren können.  
Informationsethik lässt sich demnach als deskriptive 
und emanzipatorische oder normative Theorie unter 
jeweils historischer und systematischer Perspektive 
auffassen:  
                                               
12 Wilhelm Schmid: Philosophie der Lebenskunst. 
136. 
• Als deskriptive Theorie beschreibt sie die 
verschiedenen Strukturen und Macht-
verhältnisse, die das Informationsverhalten 
in verschiedenen Kulturen und Epochen bes-
timmen. 
• Als emanzipatorische oder normative Theo-
rie befasst sie sich mit der Kritik der 
Entwicklung moralischen Verhaltens im In-
formationsbereich. Sie umfasst individuelle, 
kollektive und menschheitliche Aspekte. 
Mit anderen Worten, Informationsethik soll   
• die Entwicklung moralischen Verhaltens im 
Informationsbereich, und insbesondere im 
Bereich der digitalen Weltvernetzung, beo-
bachten,  
• Informationsmythen aufdecken und kritis-
ieren, Machtverhältnisse, die das Informa-
tionsverhalten bestimmen, analysieren, 
• verdeckte Widersprüche der herrschenden 
theoretischen und praktischen Sprachnorm-
ierung offen legen  
• die Entwicklung informationsethischer 
Fragestellungen beobachten.  
Eine so verstandene informationsethische Reflexion 
umfasst kultur- und philosophiehistorische Dimen-
sionen. Die Frage nach der Freiheit des Zugangs 
zum digitalen Netz (freedom of access) lässt sich 
zum Beispiel in Auseinandersetzung mit der mod-
ernen Pressefreiheit (freedom of the press) und der 
antiken Redefreiheit (freedom of speech) erörtern.  
Daraus ergeben sich folgende Ausbildungsziele:  
• Selbständige Erkennung und Problematis-
ierung ethischer Konflikte im digitalen In-
formationsbereich. 
• Verantwortungssinn für die Auswirkungen 
individuellen und kollektiven Handelns im 
digitalen Informationsbereich wecken. 
• Fähigkeit zum interkulturellen Dialog im 
Sinne von Anerkennung der Vielfalt von In-
formations- und Medienkulturen mit ihren 
jeweiligen Werten und Traditionen. 
• Grundkenntnisse ethischer Begriffe und 
Theorien und ihre Relevanz für die 
alltägliche Informationspraxis vermitteln. 
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Mit anderen Worten, die primäre Aufgabe einer 
Netzethik besteht darin, unser Im-Netz-sein im 
Kontext von Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit, kultureller 
Vielfalt und Chancengleichheit zu thematisieren und 
umgekehrt, diese Dimensionen menschlichen Seins 
aus der Perspektive des digitalen Weltentwurfs neu 
zu reflektieren.   
Unsere digitalen Wohnorte sind nur scheinbar raum- 
und zeitlos. Das Thema des ICIE-Symposiums 2004 
drückt eine wichtige vor uns liegende Denkaufgabe 
aus, nämlich das Lokalisieren des Internet aus 
ethischer und interkultureller Perspektive. Im Infor-
mationszeitalter sollten wir, wie Manuel Castells 
richtig bemerkt, lokal, d.h. situationsbezogen den-
ken und, in Anbetracht der global agierenden 
Mächte vor allem im Medium der Weltvernetzung, 
global handeln, denn sonst macht es keinen Unter-
schied.13 
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Without knowing the rules of the game in a specific area qualified ethical decisions within are simply not 
possible. Therefore, a fundamental understanding of the phenomenon 'media' is a prerequisite for the ‘usab-
lity’ of any media ethics. This understanding of the very basis of media is introduced by the notion of space: 
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well as in a Hilbert space) do not exist separated from each other but are (more or less) connected, are 
linked, thus acting in the media can be understood as moving in the space of communication, following the 
links. This understanding leads to fundamentally new ethical categories: media ethic is the challenge of 
ethically designing the communicative space. The appropriate ethical approach for this task can be found in 
Wittgenstein's notion of 'use'. That overcomes the 'blind' application of ethical norms to categorical distinctive 
descriptions, which is very common through the term 'applied ethics' though it can be easily proved as 
aporetic. The investigation in what the ethical 'ought' basically could mean shows that there is no normative 
meaning without a descriptive context: 'to ought' always means 'to ought' in a certain situation, be it more 
common or more specific. Ethically right then means: one can decide on the basis of good reasons to do the 
right in this or that situation. And ethics finally is the quest to categorize, structure and systemize these right 
decisions by the means of creating a comprehensive theory. These are the limits and the dignity of ethics as 
a scientific scholarship and media ethics in particular. 
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Was macht eine Medienethik 
'brauchbar'? 
Wer die Gesetze des (erfolgreichen) Handelns im 
Medienbereich nicht kennt und das heißt, laufend 
auf dem aktuellsten Stand ist, kann auch nicht 
kompetent zu den ethischen Problemen Stellung 
beziehen. In diesem Sinne ist für eine tatsächlich 
'brauchbare' Medienethik – vgl. Weil, Felix: Die 
Medien und die Ethik, 75 – zweierlei erforderlich:  
• Zunächst ein zutreffendes Grundverständnis 
des Phänomens der Medien. Der Medie-
nethiker muss wissen, wovon er im Bereich 
der Medien redet. 
• Sodann eine Ethikauffassung, welche es er-
laubt, die mit dem o.g. Grundverständnis 
gegebene angemessene Deskription des zu 
regulierenden Bereiches mit der Norma-
tivität ethischer Regulative gleichermaßen 
sachgerecht wie moralisch verbindlich zu 
verknüpfen. Der Medienethiker muss sagen 
können, was konkret getan werden soll. 
Im folgenden sollen diese beiden Grundanforderun-
gen an eine 'brauchbare' Medienethik näher ausge-
führt werden. 
Grundzüge einer 'brauchbaren' 
Medienethik 
Zutreffende Deskription der Welt der Medien als 
Unterscheidungen von Präsenz und Absenz 
Der Schlüssel zu einem zutreffenden Grundver-
ständnis von Medien, das prinzipiell für die Entwick-
lung einer 'brauchbaren' Medienethik erforderlich ist, 
liegt in dem heute vielfach unterschiedlich verwen-
deten Raumbegriff – weniger in seinem metapho-
rischen Verständnis (wie z.B. in dem vielbemühten 
Cyberraum) als vielmehr in einem mathematisch 
präzisen Sinne (nach Hilbert) als strukturelles Apriori 
einer fundierten Unterscheidung: 
• im mathematischen Sinne: als strukturierte 
Menge, also als Struktur der Unter-
scheidung, ob etwas Element einer Menge 
ist oder nicht (∈,∉) 
• im Falle der Medien: als strukturelles Apriori 
der Unterscheidung von Präsenz und Ab-
senz, also ob etwas präsent(iert) wird oder 
nicht. 
Die Welt der Medien kann formal präzise als Raum 
beschrieben werden, der den drei Bedingungen 
eines Hilbertraumes (M, M) genügt, welcher aus 
einer Trägermenge M (nun konkret aller medialen 
Präsentationen, in Summe: der Welt der Medien) 
und ihrer Struktur M (mathematisch: der Topologie 
des Raumes; für die Medien konkret: der Kontext 
einer Präsenz bzw. Absenz) besteht. Und umgekehrt 
können diese nun für die fundierte Entwicklung 
einer in obigem Sinne 'brauchbaren' Medienethik 
fruchtbar gemacht werden: 
• Bed. 1: ∅∈ M, M∈ M.  
Die Zugehörigkeit zum Raum ist eindeutig 
entscheidbar. Das heißt für die Medien: es 
ist eindeutig entscheidbar, ob etwas (im 
Raum der Kommunikation) präsent wird 
oder nicht. 
• Bed. 2: T1, T2 ∈ M → T1 ∩ T2 ∈ M.  
Alle Elemente des Raumes sind miteinander 
verknüpfbar. Das heißt für die Medien: jede 
realisierte Präsenz steht im Zusammenhang 
mit anderen Präsenzen, steht in einem Kon-
text. 
• Bed. 3: ℜ⊆ M.→ 
Τ
Τ
  ∈ ℜ
∈U  M.  
Die Vereinigung von Teilmengen von M ist 
wiederum Teilmenge von M. d.h. für die 
Medien: der Kontext erschöpft sich im Raum 
der Kommunikation, er verlässt ihn niemals 
und bedarf auch nichts außer seiner selbst. 
Zu Bed. 1: Das Wesen von Medien lässt sich 
zunächst ganz fundamental dahingehend bestim-
men, Präsenz und Absenz voneinander unterscheid-
bar zu machen: das weiße Blatt Papier, auf dem ein 
Brief, eine Nachricht, ein Artikel stehen kann oder 
eben nicht, die Mattscheibe, auf der ein Film ab-
laufen kann oder die Webpage, auf der Inhalte 
audiovisuell und interaktiv dargestellt werden kön-
nen. Ein Medium birgt prinzipiell diese Möglichkeit 
der fundierten Unterscheidung von Präsenz und 
Absenz an und in sich. Ist das Blatt weiß, ist der 
Brief nicht nur einfach nicht existent – er ist absent, 
er könnte da stehen, d.h. präsent sein (aber eben 
nur in einer bestimmten Länge etc.), tut es aber 
nicht. Und der ausgeschaltete Fernseher – als 
Medium betrachtet – wird dadurch nicht zum bloßen 
Möbelstück, sondern es hat sehr wohl seine Bedeu-
tung, wenn er ausgeschaltet ist (für die Quote, die 
zukünftige Programmgestaltung, die Werbeeinnah-
men etc.). 
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Zu Bed. 2: Weiterhin gilt: Wie in einem realen Raum 
existieren einzelne Präsenzen nicht isoliert 
voneinander, sondern sind verbunden, beziehen sich 
aufeinander, zitieren, kommentieren, negieren sich, 
sind verknüpft, verlinkt, vernetzt. Handeln im Raum 
der Medien wird damit zur Bewegung im Raum der 
Kommunikation, von einer medialen Präsenz (in 
ihrem Kontext) zu einer anderen. Und umgekehrt 
lässt sich eine mediale Präsentation nur aus ihrem 
Kontext heraus verstehen, ist darum auch zu ihrer 
ethischen Beurteilung zuallererst in diesen einzuord-
nen und nur aus diesem heraus zu bewerten. 
Zu Bed. 3: Zur Bestimmung einer realisierten 
Präsenz (für ihr zureichendes Verständnis) 
schließlich ist der Kontext innerhalb des Raumes der 
Kommunikation nicht nur notwendige sondern auch 
hinreichende Bedingung. Für Kommunikation gibt es 
nichts anderes als den Raum der Kommunikation, 
um etwas präsent zu machen. Und ist etwas 
präsent, so lässt es sich innerhalb des Raumes der 
Kommunikation (durch seinen Ort, seinen Kontext 
s.o.) vollständig bestimmen. Darum stellen die 
Medien schließlich auch einen eigenständigen 
Bereich dar, der tatsächlich einer eigenen ethischen 
Betrachtung, einer eigenen Bereichsethik, bedarf, 
die sich gar nicht aus anderen ableiten lässt. 
Eine Präsenz hat folglich immer ihren (angemesse-
nen) Ort, ihren Kontext im Raum der Kommunika-
tion, aus dem heraus sie und insbesondere ihre 
ethische Angemessenheit bestimmbar ist. Die medi-
enethische Aufgabe wird damit zur Forderung nach 
der ethischen Gestaltung dieses Raumes der Kom-
munikation: der Reflexion auf die strukturelle Er-
möglichung und Sicherstellung seiner ethisch ange-
messenen Erschließung bzw. Erschließbarkeit, seiner 
Begehung bzw. Begehbarkeit, der Orientierung darin 
sowie seiner ständigen Erweiterung und/oder Be-
grenzung. 
Während mit dem Raumbegriff das strukturelle 
Apriori für mediale Kommunikation noch ganz an-
schaulich gefasst werden kann, ist mit dem er-
läuterungsbedürftigen Präsenzbegriff deren materi-
aler Grund bezeichnet. 'Präsenz' ist dabei jedoch 
gerade nicht als eine Fundamentaleigenschaft zu 
verstehen, sondern vielmehr als die fundamentale 
Handlungsweise, welche den darauf sich 
entwickelnden Bereich der Medien begründet.14 
                                               
14 Für den interessierten Leser sei auf die analoge 
Figur bei Wittgenstein verwiesen, dem die Entwick-
lung dieser Position viel verdankt: „Die Begründung 
aber … kommt zu einem Ende; – das Ende aber ist 
Letztlich kann auch diese Handlungsweise auf dem 
Grunde des Bereiches der Medien analog zu der 
verstanden werden, die für die Entwicklung des 
mathematischen Raumes oben auch schon gefordert 
wurde: nämlich letztlich als die Handlungsweise 
(aktiv verstanden), eine Entscheidung zu treffen, die 
einen Unterschied macht bzw. andersherum (passiv 
verstanden), einen Unterschied darzustellen, der im 
Einzelfall eine konkret fundierte Entscheidung er-
möglicht: ob etwas Element ist oder nicht, oder wie 
im Falle der Medien: ob etwas präsent wird oder 
nicht. 
Die Fundamentalhandlung für den Bereich der 
Medien kann nun präzise von anderen abgegrenzt 
werden: 
• Präsenz ist zu unterscheiden von Wahrneh-
mung: Wahrnehmungen (Berührungen, 
Kälte, Wärme, Feuchtigkeit etc.) wie ein 
'Kühles Nass' werden durch die mediale 
Vermittlung (z.B. durch das Wort 'Wasser') 
in 'präsent' oder 'absent' unterscheidbar. 
'Wasser' erfüllt von nun an den Ort des 
'Kühlen Nass' in dem neuen, damit erst 
eröffneten, also mit der Fähigkeit zur Unter-
scheidung gleichursprünglichen Raum der 
Präsenz. 
• Präsenz ist auch zu unterscheiden von Ver-
stehen: Sehr leicht ließe sich 'Präsenz' auf-
grund des o.g. vermittelnden Moments des 
Mediums als so etwas wie semantisches 
Verstehen missverstehen: als Verstehen 
dessen, was durch sinnfällige Zeichen 
bezeichnet wird. Um dies zu vermeiden 
wurde das Vermittelnde Moment gerade 
nicht als Verweis über sich hinaus präzisiert, 
sondern als bestimmtes Verhältnis zunächst 
allgemein gehalten. Darum nun genauer: 
Präsenz ist von Verstehen (bzw. einem her-
meneutisch geprägtem und auch in der 
Phänomenologie nachweisbaren Verständnis 
von Verstehen) zu unterscheiden, insofern 
das Medium auf nichts ('Essentielles') ver-
weist, das durch geeignete Methode 'er-
schlossen' werden kann; es bezeichnet nicht 
'etwas' (Unabhängiges), das damit besser 
oder schlechter getroffen werden kann. Eine 
                                                                            
nicht, daß uns gewisse Sätze unmittelbar als wahr 
einleuchten [mediale Präsentationen uns präsent 
werden, FW], also eine Art Sehen unsrerseits; 
sondern unser Handeln, welches am Grunde des 
Sprachspiels [der Medienethik, FW] liegt.“ Wittgen-
stein, Ludwig: Über Gewissheit. § 109f. 
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Präsenz, so lässt sich das bestimmte 
Verhältnis nun abgrenzen, ist kein Verweis 
auf etwas, sondern einzig und allein das, als 
was sie im Raum der Kommunikation, in 
einem Kontext 'gebraucht' wird bzw. werden 
kann, um zu unterscheiden, was in diesem 
Kontext einen Unterschied macht. 
Diese Einsicht ist weitreichend: Jeder Mensch ist 
damit immer (auch) einer, der mit Medien in diesem 
allgemeinen Sinne umgeht - nicht nur einer, der 
heutzutage kontingenterweise mit Darstellungen 
und Literatur, Presse, Radio, Film, Fernsehen oder 
Internet umzugehen hat, um auf dem Laufenden zu 
bleiben, um mitreden zu können oder um sein 
täglich Brot zu verdienen. Sondern noch in einem 
viel ursprünglicheren Sinne gilt: durch seinen 
Umgang mit Medien ist eine Grunddimension des 
Menschseins in Augenschein genommen – in der 
antiken Formulierung noch konkret auf das Medium 
der Sprache bezogen: Der Mensch sei dasjenige 
Lebewesen, das über Sprache verfügt – nun allge-
meiner: das Lebewesen, das Medien zu gebrauchen 
weiß. 
Brauchbare Medienethik als Verknüpfung von 
zutreffender Deskription der Medien und ethisch 
legitimer Normierung 
Die Stellung nun, die man zu konkreten Normen 
einnimmt, die auf dem o.g. Grundverständnis basie-
ren, hängt wesentlich davon ab, welchen Status 
man prinzipiell normativen bzw. deskriptiven Ele-
menten in der Ethik einräumt. Eine jede Bereichs-
ethik steht letztlich in diesem Spannungsverhältnis. 
Im folgenden soll dargestellt werden, dass man sich 
weder letztlich für eine der beiden Seiten entschei-
den muss, noch dass die Unauflöslichkeit dieses 
Spannungsfeldes Anlass für einen ethischen Skepti-
zismus sein muss. Im Gegenteil: für eine 'brauchba-
re' Ethik fordert der Autor (in: Die Medien und Ethik, 
48): 
• eine "normativ be- und nicht ver-urteilte 
Deskriptivität" 
gleichermaßen wie 
• eine "deskriptiv ge- und nicht ent-schärfte 
Normativität" 
In diesem Sinne kann es einerseits gar keine norma-
tiv unbestimmt erschließbare Domäne reiner De-
skriptivität geben (auch nicht den Bereich der Me-
dien) und andererseits ebenso keine deskriptions-
freie Aufstellung einer Norm (in einer reinen, allge-
meinen Ethik). Jede Norm ist dann immer schon 
prinzipiell auf einen Bereich ihrer konkreten Gültig-
keit bezogen und jede Beschreibung eines Hand-
lungsbereiches (jede Einsicht in sein Funktionieren, 
seine Gesetzmäßigkeiten wie oben für den Bereich 
der Medien gefordert) mag für oder gegen die 
Gültigkeit einer Norm sprechen. Beide stehen dann 
nicht mehr unabhängig nebeneinander, wie norma-
tive und deskriptive Prämisse im reinen, praktischen 
Syllogismus und werden in der Ethik einfach nur 
logisch notwendig zusammengeführt. Sondern die 
Beschreibung der Anwendungsfälle von Normen ist 
dann konstitutives Element ihrer verbindlichen 
Formulierung - und nicht allein ihre praktische 
Notwendigkeit. Und genauso ist die inpflichtneh-
mende Norm immer schon konstitutives Element für 
die zutreffende, im konkreten Fall zu gebende 
Beschreibung der entsprechenden Situation – und 
diese nicht nur das Material des Handwerks der 
Anwendung von Normen.  Mit Kant, gegen Kant, 
wird diese Position in Weil, Felix: Die Medien und die 
Ethik. 48, kurzgefasst als: "Normativität ohne De-
skriptivität ist leer, Deskriptivität ohne Normativität 
ist blind." 
Diese Positionsbestimmung der Medienethik als 
Bereichsethik, genauer: als eine im Bereich der 
Medien 'brauchbare' Ethik, ist im folgenden genauer 
zu betrachten. Der späte Wittgenstein steht mit 
seiner allgemeinen Lösung des Problems des Regel-
folgens – exemplarisch: Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Über 
Gewissheit. §§ 26, 27, 139 - Pate dafür:15 
"… Was nützt uns … eine Regel? Könnten wir 
uns bei ihrer Anwendung nicht (wieder) irren? 
Wollte man aber dafür etwas Regelartiges 
angeben, so würde der Ausdruck 'unter 
normalen Umständen' vorkommen. Und die 
normalen Umstände erkennt man, aber man 
kann sie nicht genau beschreiben. Eher noch 
eine Reihe von abnormalen. 
Um eine Praxis festzulegen, genügen nicht 
Regeln, sondern man braucht auch Beispiele. 
Unsere Regeln lassen Hintertüren offen, und die 
Praxis muß für sich selbst sprechen.”  
Drei Aspekte sind daraus für die Entwicklung einer 
'brauchbaren' Ethik von Bedeutung: Das Problem 
des Irrtums in der Anwendung einer Regel, die 
Frage nach dem Spezifikum gelungenen Regelbefol-
gens und die Frage nach der wissenschaftlichen 
                                               
15 Die Idee der Möglichkeit, eine Ethik aus der 
Philosophie Wittgensteins zu entwickeln, findet sich 
bereits in Roberts, Julian: Das rechnende Subjekt. 
IJIE 
International Journal of Information Ethics Vol.  1  (06/2004) 
 
Felix Weil: Von der Ethik des Mediengebrauchs zu einer 'brauchbaren' Medienethik 15 
Theoriebildung auf dem so gewonnenen Funda-
ment. 
Regel, Anwendung und Irrtumsmöglichkeit 
Zunächst zum erstgenannten Problem des Irrtums in 
der Anwendung. Eine einfache und darum wohl 
auch intuitiv einleuchtende Annäherung daran ist 
das Schachspiel: Hier gibt es einerseits Zugregeln, 
wie z.B. ein Springer oder ein Läufer zu ziehen sei - 
vergleichbar ethischen Normen. Und dann gibt es 
spezifische Situationen, in denen der eine oder aber 
der andere Zug richtig wäre - vergleichbar konkret 
beschreibbaren Situationen. Welcher regelkonforme 
Zug aber in welcher konkreten Situation anzu-
wenden sei, das gerade ist die Kunst des Schach-
spiels. Schon die im Vergleich zur Wirklichkeit des 
menschlichen Lebens immer noch geringe Kom-
plexität des Schachspiels mit seinen 64 Feldern und 
32 Figuren macht es unmöglich, den jeweils richti-
gen Zug in einer konkreten Situation in einem 
umfassenden Katalog nachschlagbar zu machen. 
Philosophiegeschichtlich ist auf das Scheitern der 
Tradition der kasuistischen Ethik zu verweisen, die 
v.a. in der katholischen Moraltheologie im Anschluss 
an das Konzil von Trient im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert 
zur Perfektion getrieben wurde. Nicht bestritten 
werden soll dabei die Nützlichkeit von anschaulichen 
Beispielen und paradigmatischen Fallsammlungen, 
wie sie sich auch im Schachspiel zum Beispiel in 
Form von Eröffnungs- oder Endspielbibliotheken 
finden. 
Systematisch ist daher darzulegen, dass es bei allem 
Streben danach in der Ethik keinen umfassenden 
Katalog geben kann. Für das Schachspiel ist dies 
zunächst gerade nicht einleuchtend, da sich prin-
zipiell jeder Zug und alle möglichen Folgen in endli-
cher Form beschreiben lassen, dank der Beschrän-
kung auf die 64 Felder und 32 Figuren. Genau diese 
notwendige Beschränkung aber macht den umfas-
senden Katalog der in einem konkreten Fall zu 
wählenden Regelanwendungen in der Wirklichkeit 
unmöglich. Einerseits kann man nicht die Totalität 
aller prinzipiell unendlichen Umstände in die 
konkrete Entscheidungsfindung mit einbeziehen - 
warum sollte die Stellung der Sterne oder der Flug 
der Vögel nicht (mehr) berücksichtigt werden? 
Andererseits, und dies ist entscheidend, würde die 
Existenz eines solchen Kataloges das Schachspiel als 
Spiel sinnlos machen – und würde dazu führen, dass 
man es entsprechend erweitert, auf mehrere 
Ebenen z.B. wie in der Science-Fiction-Serie Raum-
schiff-Enterprise, oder in Bezug auf die Regeln, auf 
denen der Katalog basiert, welche z.B. abwechselnd 
durch die Spieler beliebig modifiziert werden kön-
nten. 
Diese Dynamik ist aus der Paradoxientheorie als das 
Phänomen der Rächerparadoxien bekannt. Rächer-
paradoxien reagieren auf das Vorliegen einer 
Lösung, indem sie wiederum diese selbst ad absur-
dum führen. Der Umstand selbst, dass es eine 
Lösung gibt – das also z.B. ein Katalog für das 
Schachspiel existiert – ist in dem Katalog selbst nicht 
als Fall (der 64 Felder und 32 Figuren) beschreibbar. 
Er tritt sozusagen zu den im Katalog betrachteten 
Umständen neu hinzu. Der Katalog, insofern er mit 
absolutem Anspruch auftritt, ist damit in dem 
Augenblick seiner Erstellung veraltet, da er nicht die 
Totalität aller möglichen Umstände beschreibt, 
insbesondere seine eigene Existenz vernachlässigt. 
Ein in obigem Sinne geführtes, gutes Rächer-
Argument gegen einen ethischen Katalog, selbst 
wenn er umfassend existierte, wäre z.B. dass im 
Falle seiner Existenz seine (stupide) Anwendung 
ethisch verwerflich wäre, weil sie der Freiheit und 
Selbstbestimmung des menschlichen Subjektes 
widerspräche. 
Es muss also (noch) eine andere Lösung geben, als 
die bloße Anwendung von ethischen Normen auf 
davon kategorial zu unterscheidende Situations-
beschreibungen, wenn in jedem Fall eine ethische 
Entscheidung bezüglich der Alternativen prinzipiell 
möglich sein soll – wie gesagt: viele paradigma-
tische Fälle lassen sich mit der ersteren Methode 
erschlagen, jedoch weder theoretisch noch praktisch 
alle möglichen und v.a. nicht die komplexen in 
einem spezifischen, dynamischen Bereich, wie ihn 
z.B. die Medien darstellen. Diese Einsicht findet sich 
interessanterweise schon bei Thomas von Aquin: 
"Man muß aber wissen, dass etwas in 
zweifacher Weise sich vom natürlichen Gesetz 
[das ist die Ethik, FW] herleiten kann: einmal 
wie die Folgesätze aus den Grundsätzen 
[conclusio, FW]; ein anderes Mal, wie nähere 
Bestimmungen allgemeiner Sätze [determinatio, 
FW]. ... die zweite gleicht jener, in der bei den 
Künstlern die allgemeinen Vorformen auf etwas 
Besonderes hin ausgearbeitet werden; so muß 
der Künstler die allgemeine Vorform 'Haus' zu 
dieser oder jener Form des Hauses 
ausarbeiten"16 
                                               
16 Thomas von Aquin: Summa Theologiae. I, II, 95, 
2 
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Spezifikum gelungenen Regelbefolgens 
Und damit zum zweiten Gedanken, der für die 
Entwicklung einer 'brauchbaren' Medienethik, deren 
Spezifikum in der Verknüpfung von Deskription und 
Normierung liegt, fruchtbar gemacht werden soll: 
den abnormalen Umständen, an denen man gelun-
genes bzw. verfehltes Regelbefolgen am besten 
erkennt. 
Zunächst wieder philosophiegeschichtlich ist hier an 
die Behandlung moralischer Konflikte anzuknüpfen, 
an denen deutlich wird, wie zu einer konkreten 
Entscheidung zu gelangen ist - paradigmatisch 
beschrieben z.B. in Sophie’s Choice: der 
Entscheidung, welches ihrer Zwillingskinder, vor die 
Wahl gestellt durch einen KZ-Aufseher, sie für die 
Gaskammer selektieren soll (oder aber ihr beide 
genommen werden, wenn sie keine Wahl trifft). 
Einerseits ist ein echter Konfliktfall, wie auch immer 
er zu beschreiben sei, im Rahmen einer Ethik, die 
immer schon im Vorhinein weiß, was zu tun ist, die 
mit praktischer Notwendigkeit, wie exemplarisch 
Kant sagt, aus obersten Prinzipien ableitet, gar nicht 
denkbar: 
"Da aber Pflicht und Verbindlichkeit überhaupt 
Begriffe sind, welche die objektive, praktische 
Notwendigkeit gewisser Handlungen ausdrücken 
und zwei einander entgegengesetzte Regeln 
nicht zugleich notwendig sein können, ... so ist 
eine Kollision von Pflichten und Verbindlichkeiten 
gar nicht denkbar."17 
Und doch existieren sie, nicht nur in der 
Anschaulichkeit wegen konstruierten Extremfällen. 
Sie rigoros zu leugnen wäre an der Realität 
menschlichen Handelns und der Not der darin 
verstrickten sträflich vorbei argumentiert. 
Andererseits gibt die klassische Lösung des 
Utilitarismus: die Wahl des je Besseren, 
Nützlicheren, die normative Inpflichtnahme gänzlich 
preis: ein nicht gangbarer Weg für eine 'brauchbare' 
Ethik, die mit dem Anspruch auftritt, intellektuell 
redlich sagen zu können, was konkret zu tun sein 
soll. 
Eine überzeugende Lösung hat Levi mit der Ver-
wendung des Sollensbegriffes im Sinne von konkret 
'entscheidbar' vorgelegt: 
                                               
17 Kant, Immanuel: Metaphysik der Sitten. 330.  
"I say the agent ought to perform some option 
which is optimal relative to some permissible 
way of evaluation."18 
Auf die Analogie eines solchen Verständnisses zu 
Freges Kontextprinzip19 verweist Vossenkuhl (1993, 
143) in seiner Analyse des Verhältnisses von Norma-
tivität und Deskriptivität in der Ethik: 
"So wie nach diesem Prinzip Wörter nur im 
Kontext ganzer Sätze eine bestimmte Bedeutung 
haben, bildet die deskriptive Bedeutung von 
Regeln den Kontext, in dem Ausdrücke wie 'gut', 
'richtig', 'sollen' ihre normative Bedeutung 
haben. Normative Bedeutung gibt es nur im 
Kontext von deskriptiver.” 
Die Folge eines solchen, prinzipiell situativen Sol-
lensbegriffes ist, dass damit einerseits Konflikte 
anerkannt und kohärent beschrieben werden kön-
nen und andererseits die sittliche Inpflichtnahme 
einer deontologischen Ethik, nämlich sich soundso  
entscheiden zu sollen, vollständig erhalten bleibt 
ohne telelogisch reduziert zu werden: Gesollt ist, 
wozu ich mich in einem konkreten Fall ethisch 
gerechtfertigt entscheiden kann. In den Worten von 
Wittgenstein: 
"'Der Satz ist wahr oder falsch' heißt eigentlich 
nur, es müsse eine Entscheidung für oder gegen 
ihn möglich sein.”20 
Im Grunde ist damit unser Alltagsverständnis von 
Moral wiedergegeben: dass es in konkreten Situa-
tionen zutreffende und nicht-zutreffende Entschei-
dungen gibt, ob dies oder jenes zu tun sei, genauso 
wie, ob dieser oder jener Werkstoff in einem be-
stimmten Fall verwendet werden kann. Dies kann 
jedoch nur erzielt werden, wenn der Konsequenz 
aus dem oben Gesagten von vorneherein schon im 
Ansatz einer Ethik Rechnung getragen wird: nämlich 
dass Deskriptivität - die Weise, wie wir zu 
Situationsbeschreibungen kommen - und Nor-
mativität - die Weise, wie wir Verpflichtungen 
bestimmen - prinzipiell so ursprünglich 
ineinandergreifen, wie in dem situativen Sol-
                                               
18 Levi, Isaac: Hard Choices. 23 
19 „Nach der Bedeutung der Wörter muß im Satzzu-
sammenhange, nicht in ihrer Vereinzelung gefragt 
werden.“ Frege, Gottlob: Die Grundlagen der Arith-
metik. XXII. 
20 Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Über Gewissheit. 200 
IJIE 
International Journal of Information Ethics Vol.  1  (06/2004) 
 
Felix Weil: Von der Ethik des Mediengebrauchs zu einer 'brauchbaren' Medienethik 17 
Sollensbegriff von Levi, so dass prinzipiell jede 
Entscheidung sich aus dieser Verschränkung heraus 
begründet. 
An einem Beispiel: Die Norm, die Wahrheit zu 
sagen, wird kaum allgemein bestritten, weder in 
unserem Alltagsverständnis, noch in einer 
ernsthaften Ethik. Der Einfachheit halber kann sie 
hier für die folgenden situationsbezogenen Über-
legungen als gegeben angenommen werden – eine 
angemessene Vorgehensweise zur Theoriebildung in 
der Bereichsethik wird im anschließenden Abschnitt 
noch ausführlicher dargelegt werden. Auf der an-
deren Seite können wir genügend Situationen 
beschreiben, in denen uns die Inpflichtnahme durch 
diese Norm sehr wohl strittig erscheint – am deut-
lichsten wird dies wie bereits gesagt an (kon-
struierten) Extremen. Wenn wir uns nun z.B. in dem 
vielfach diskutierten und zumeist auch einschlägig 
beschiedenen Fall - SS-Schergen klopfen an die Tür 
und fragen nach versteckten Flüchtlingen – nicht an 
die Wahrheit halten und ihre Anwesenheit leugnen, 
um den Betreffenden das Leben zu retten, dann 
setzen wir dadurch das Verbot, zu lügen, nicht 
außer Kraft. Wir müssen dadurch nicht seine 
normative Verpflichtung leugnen, sondern wir 
handeln vielmehr aus der Einsicht, dass mit der in 
der Norm 'Du sollst nicht Lügen' immer schon 
enthaltenen Deskription eine solche Situation nicht 
erfasst und gemeint sein kann, dass also diese Norm 
in diesem Fall – und gemäß des situativen 
Sollensbegriff ist sie prinzipiell auf angemessene 
Fälle bezogen - gar nicht verpflichten will. Wir sind 
dann geneigt, die Handlungsweise in diesem Fall 
nicht als unverändert verwerfliche 'Lüge', sondern 
vielmehr als gebotene Nottäuschung oder ziviler 
Ungehorsam zu bezeichnen.  
Und wir kennen noch viele andere und weniger 
dramatische Situationen (wie z.B. so manches, 
beliebtes Gesellschaftsspiel, aber auch solche im 
Rahmen von Höflichkeitsfloskeln, Witzen, Anekdoten 
oder Parodien), in denen wir durch unsere ethisch 
gerechtfertigte Entscheidung gegen die Wahrheit 
nicht die grundsätzliche Gültigkeit des Lügenverbo-
tes leugnen wollen, noch dessen Anwendbarkeit auf 
den konkreten Fall bestreiten, sondern in denen wir 
allein durch die zureichende Beschreibung der 
jeweiligen Situationen (Spiel etc.) besser verstehen, 
was mit dem Gebot eigentlich gemeint ist, wozu es 
immer schon konkret verpflichten wollte und wozu 
nicht.  
Wir folgen damit aber gerade nicht einer Regel der 
richtigen Anwendung einer als separat existierend 
zu verstehenden Normen (bei der wir uns wieder 
irren könnten, s.o.), sondern wir lernen besser 
verstehen, zu was die Normen immer schon 
verpflichten. Vielmehr bleibt die Norm auch in 
diesen Situationen voll und ganz erhalten: auch 
wenn wir in einem Spiel oder in einem Witz über 
eine bestimmte Person oder aus Höflichkeit nicht die 
Wahrheit sagen: Lügen dürfen wir dadurch noch 
lange nicht – und tun es damit auch nicht. 
Vom situativen Sollensbegriff zur  
ethischen Theorie 
Und damit zum dritten Aspekt, der mit dem Witt-
genstein-Zitat eingangs aufgeworfen wurde: Wie 
kommt man ausgehend von einem solchen Sollens-
begriff zu einer Ethik, wie legen wir die Regeln für 
Praxis systematisch, den Anforderungen an eine 
wissenschaftliche Theorie genügend fest? Und nun 
können wir darauf intellektuell redlich mit Wittgen-
stein antworten: 
"Wir lernen die Praxis nicht, indem wir Regeln 
lernen [aus einem Katalog, s.o. – FW]. Es 
werden uns Urteile beigebracht [Entscheidungen 
bezüglich konkrektem Sollen, s.o. – FW] und ihr 
Zusammenhang mit anderen Urteilen. Ein 
ganzes von Urteilen wird uns plausibel gemacht. 
... (Das Licht geht nach und nach über das 
Ganze auf).”21 
Damit gibt es kein besonderes Begründungsproblem 
der Angewandten Ethik mehr (das über das allge-
meine Begründungproblem praktischer Philosophie 
hinausginge). Es ist entschärft worden durch die 
Klärung dessen, was es bedeutet, überhaupt eine 
ethische Verpflichtung formulieren zu können. Daran 
schließt sich das systematischen Bemühen an, 
solche Formulierungen im Rahmen einer wissen-
schaftlichen Theorie für einen eigenständigen 
Bereich – und das sind die Medien wie oben durch 
die zutreffende Deskription als eigenständiger 
(Hilbert-)Raum gezeigt - zu erfassen. 
Die eigentümliche Struktur der Ethik als Theorie des 
Gebrauchs – vom professionellen Sachgebrauch 
ausgehend, über ethische Theoriebildung zu einem 
je sachgerechteren Gebrauch zu führen, soll hier in 
dem Begriff der 'brauchbaren' Ethik festgehalten 
werden. Der Sache nach war sie bereits Aristoteles 
bewusst, wenn er in der Nikomachischen Ethik nur 
ältere Semester für ethische Überlegungen geeignet 
hält: 
                                               
21 Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Über Gewissheit. 147 
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"Der Jüngling ... hat ja noch keine Erfahrung im 
wirklichen Leben. Gerade von diesem aber 
gehen die Vorträge aus und dieses haben sie 
zum Gegenstand ... das Ziel ist hier nicht 
Erkenntnis, sondern Handeln [und der 
Ausgangspunkt ebenso, das ist das ganze 
Geheimnis, FW]”22 
Eine Bereichsethik auf diesem Fundament liegt nun 
nicht unter der Würde einer philosophischen Ethik, 
weil Normativität immer schon auf Deskription 
bezogen ist. Allgemeine Ethik und Bereichsethik 
unterscheiden sich nach diesem Verständnis gar 
nicht mehr in ihrer Methodik (Grundlegung versus 
Ableitung), sondern vielmehr in ihrem Anwendungs-
bereich (Handeln im Allgemeinen und im Beson-
deren eines Bereiches). Gemeinsam ist ihnen der 
Versuch der wissenschaftlichen Systematisierung – 
nicht mehr und nicht weniger. Wer von einer wis-
senschaftlichen Theorie mehr fordert, der kann mit 
Nida-Rümelin … 
"... die Ethik guten Gewissens aus dem Bereich 
der Wissenschaften ausschließen, mit ihr 
zusammen dann allerdings auch andere 
systematisierende Bemühungen, die gemeinhin 
als Wissenschaft gelten [wie z.B. die Architektur 
- um den Kreis zu der Erkenntnisweise der 
determinatio zu schließen, die Thomas von 
Aquin für die Ethik als notwendig reklamiert hat 
– die völlig zurecht an der Universität gelehrt 
wird, FW]”23 
Eine 'brauchbare' Medienethik kann damit als 
holistischer, ethischer Objektivismus des 'Objekt'-
Bereiches der Medien kurzgefasst werden. Das 
diesem Konzept gemäße Fehlen von uneinholbaren 
allgemeinethischen Grundsätzen, die eine 
Medienethik nur mehr folgerichtig anzuwenden 
hätte, ist darum kein Mangel, der zu einem 
beliebigen Pragmatismus führt, sondern 
Charakteristikum ihres systematischen Bemühens, 
das sie als eben 'brauchbare' Medienethik 
auszeichnet und nicht desavouiert. 
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embodying the necessary rules and principles in an all-encompassing code of conduct? Or will any such 
endeavors simply shatter on the differences of cultures? Ought they be labeled as sort of attempted imperial-
ism, more subtle perhaps in comparison with other forms of cultural imperialism—but nevertheless an at-
tempt of such? If so, then ethical concepts need to be restricted to territorially or ethnically specific realms. In 
that case, the quest for Net-Ethics could perhaps be substituted by pragmatic actions: instruments of control 
that are simply technical and formal, devoid of moral input and moral convictions. Such a viewpoint has been 
offered lately in the form of a concept by the Bertelsmann Foundation, which combines rating and filtering 
instruments with a social lattice-work of net-supervision and transnational combinations of institutions of 
control. That concept indeed has its charm. It has its problems too; problems that can be made obvious from 
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matic action. The text therefore reconstructs the concept in question, criticizes it and attempts to sketch an 
ethical approach to the problem that respects diversity and plurality. 
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Introduction 
Freedom cannot exist on its own. At the least, it 
must be enabled by restrictions against any attempt 
to use freedom to destroy its further existence (as 
happened for example in the German Weimarer 
Republik by the actions of the Nazis). Thus free-
dom—or to be more specific: the possibility of the 
universal sustainable use of freedom—has to be 
secured by measures of control. That seems to be 
necessary also in the case of freedom of communi-
cation and action on the Internet. Thus, in the last 
few years certain proposals have been presented to 
bring the Net under normative control. Most re-
cently, concepts suggesting the control of Internet 
content in the form of a rating system and possibili-
ties based on such ratings that would enable the 
filtering or blocking of specific content have received 
special attention. Concurrent with the discourse over 
the necessity and form of an Internet ethics—for 
example in the ICIE—practical models und instru-
ments for the normative regulation of Internet 
communication are therefore already available. The 
fact of availability seems to beg the question, 
whether an academic, ethical discourse appears to 
be even necessary at all, or whether such a discus-
sion could be replaced simply by pragmatic con-
trols—if this replacement has not already occurred. 
Moreover, this question can be seriously supple-
mented with another: whether the path of rating, 
filtering and blocking would not eventually be the 
more favorable. Not least because of the Communi-
tarianism debate, though in another context, has it 
become clear that ethical concepts—down even to 
foundational reflections—are culturally specific, or at 
the least that they cannot be conceived without 
certain culturally specific interests. This realization 
confronts the discussion about Internet ethics with 
its most trying difficulty: on the one hand, it should 
introduce a culturally-overlapping, generally accept-
able proposal, while on the other hand it must 
unavoidably argue from culturally specific view-
points, fundamental beliefs and preferences. From 
there, rating, filtering, and blocking could definitely 
offer a solution, if the corresponding possibilities 
were to be restricted to a particular cultural commu-
nity, or, better yet, if the individual users would 
decide for themselves. Several different normative 
standards could be used in place of an Internet 
ethics; the use of which would make it superfluous, 
whether the standards followed certain ethical 
norms, or if they were based more on esthetic, 
functional, or educational theories. On-site prag-
matic controls could not only substitute for the 
arduous, ethical discourse, but could also accom-
plish the following: they would be the functional 
equivalent of an Internet ethics, while simultane-
ously solving a problem that is most likely ethically 
impenetrable. 
The quest for Internet ethics would then be obso-
lete, and the ICIE could then stop its endeavors in 
that field. But is the answer to the necessity of Net-
control on behalf of its freedom that simple? May 
pragmatic action, devoid of universal moral princi-
ples and convictions, indeed supplant something like 
global ethics for the Net? In the following text I shall 
scrutinize that question by first recapitulating the 
concept(s) of rating and filtering, second pointing 
out its inherent and not sufficiently reflected prob-
lems and third proposing a concept for finding ways 
towards global ethics of the Net that at the same 
time do not destroy diversity and difference. 
Rating the Net 
Rating and filtering concepts have been offered at 
least since the 1990ies. For the establishment of an 
all-encompassing Net-control but two concepts 
(building on one another) seem specifically relevant. 
The first concept was outlined by Paul Resnick and 
James Miller (Resnick/Miller 1996), who through the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) were partici-
pants in the development of the Platform for Inter-
net Content Selection (PICS). Being a standard PICS 
does not profess to give any material criteria for 
filtering and blocking, but rather provides a formal 
structure, which can be filled with such criteria to a 
certain extent. Using PICS as a foundation, filtering 
and blocking programs, as well as labels for web-
sites and documents, can be constructed: the labels 
are then read by the programs and according to the 
default selections, results are furnished. Thus, for 
instance, the Recreational Software Advisory Council 
(RSAC) has submitted a system of classification with 
material content—it works with the descriptors 
violence, nudity, sex, and language, which are 
further differentiated. Microsoft has built this classi-
fication system into its Internet Explorer on the 
foundation of PICS, allowing users access to the 
corresponding filters. That way, the selection of 
results comes one-sidedly from the filters. On one 
hand, the filters select according to negative lists of 
URLs which are put together by the software pro-
ducers and block out those that contain the afore-
mentioned descriptors. At the same time, websites 
and documents—often the title lines—are compared 
against a list of forbidden words, and selections are 
made in this way. Corresponding to their world view 
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and cultural, esthetic, and moral attitudes, different 
nations, organizations, and groups should develop 
material criteria for labels as well as filtering and 
blocking programs. Labels should be provided from 
those that operate the websites or the authors of 
documents, yet third parties also should be able to 
offer suggestions. It should be possible, therefore, 
to characterize a website or document with several 
labels—even without the author’s or operator’s 
permission. As a result, at the label level different 
cultural and group-specific attitudes can be mir-
rored. This way, through blocking and filtering, 
Resnick and Miller intend to reproduce, and also 
simultaneously preserve, global plurality and the 
pluralism of modern, democratic societies (Res-
nick/Miller 1996). 
The second concept builds off the first. Worked out 
by the Bertelsmann Stiftung in 1999, containing a 
high level of international cooperation, it was intro-
duced in book form in 2000 (Memorandum 2000). 
The concept is distinctive in that it takes Resnick 
and Miller’s proposal and develops it further into a 
mechanism combining technical, social, and institu-
tional controls. First of all, the plan for the technical 
component is for the authors of content on the 
Internet—and not third parties—to provide labels 
according to a basic keyword list (Memorandum 
2000, 46). On the basis of this same list, different 
organizations and groups—churches for example—
should be able to draw up templates: that is combi-
nations of words, whose permissibility or imper-
missibility would be assigned in turn through various 
criteria—the protection of children and youth, moral 
conceptions, standards of esthetic taste, etc. More-
over, the templates should be supplemented by lists 
of individual websites, classified as either suitable or 
unsuitable, or even by additional filters, enabling a 
value-based, fine-tuning or intensification of the 
original filter (Memorandum 2000, 47). The selec-
tion process is then carried out in accordance with 
the value-templates and lists, whereby the users 
should be able to decide, which filters from which 
groups and organizations they would like to utilize. 
In order to enable a comprehensive filtering-process 
and to keep the demands on the competence of the 
users low, a filter of the user’s choice should be 
installed with the purchase of the computer (Memo-
randum 2000, 48). 
At this technical level, the Internet is then embed-
ded in the social monitoring through its users, which 
simultaneously should be provided institutional 
supports. This monitoring is focused in two ways: 
firstly, the users should test, whether they deem 
certain content to be illegal consulting the valid laws 
of their countries. Secondly in the case of legal 
content, they should weigh according to their discre-
tion, whether an Internet site has been properly 
classified: that is, provided with the proper labels 
(Memorandum 2000, 51-61). The institutional 
supports then should provide this monitoring with 
power to carry out its findings. In order to enable 
self-control of the Internet, the concept advocates 
that each country establishes to this end: hotlines 
for service providers; the facilitation of self-
monitoring activities; rating and filtering organiza-
tions, etc. (Memorandum 2000, 52) In the course of 
this, hotline operators should cooperate with one 
another, both within their respective countries as 
well as internationally, and conclude a framework of 
various agreements to do this (Memorandum 2000, 
33). In order to achieve the appropriate sanctioning 
power, for the area of legal content, it appears 
necessary that providers subjugate themselves to 
the procedures of self-regulation (Memorandum 
2000, 54). Concerning illegal content, the world-
wide network of hotlines should work together with 
criminal prosecution agencies. Illegal content should 
be prosecuted always there, where the servers 
storing the data are located, according the laws of 
that country. Thus the concept envisions the estab-
lishment of much more an efficient, regulative 
control of the Internet, than any efforts to establish 
uniform, international regulations could ever pro-
vide. 
Why Rating and Filtering Cannot 
Suspend Ethics 
At first sight these concepts in fact appear to be 
able to form a functional equivalent to a concept of 
universal ethical standards for the Internet. The 
performance of multiple filters seems to take the 
place of binding, culturally overlapping decisions 
concerning values and norms. Consequently, Inter-
net ethics would be superfluous, and a discussion 
about the (im)possibility of such would no longer be 
required. Yet, this first impression is deceptive. Not 
only do both concepts present a list of technical and 
organizational problems—which, unfortunately, 
cannot be handled in full here—but they also pose 
an ethical problem in themselves. Moreover, this 
problem is inherent to solutions of this nature. The 
problem is made apparent, when one (first) directs 
one´s attention to the social processes out of which 
the concepts emerged. 
These processes are not quite novel in the history of 
the media both in the US as well as in Germany 
(Hausmanninger 1992). As a rule, one runs into the 
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situation, wherein a particular social group scandal-
izes a new medium of communication, because they 
hold either parts or the entire content thereof to be 
dangerous. The more effectively this group organ-
izes itself and the more older, prevalent media 
absorb the expressed reservations, the greater the 
pressure will be at the political level to answer 
comprehensively the reservations with legal regula-
tions. Usually, media enterprises attempt to get 
around such political rule-making by means of self-
censure in the form of self-control. The establish-
ment of the American Comics Code of 1954 can be 
viewed as a virtual paradigm for this process; an 
analogy can be found in the development of the 
German Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Fernsehen (televi-
sion self control, FSF) in 1992. Normally supporters 
of self-control argue that it better serves the preser-
vation of freedom of the media and communication 
than would governmental intervention, and, more-
over, that the requirements of the democratic 
public—more correct: relevant groups—could be 
better realized thereby. 
With regards to the Internet, this process was 
initiated in the United States through the debate 
concerning the presentation of sexual content, while 
the German discussion additionally focused itself on 
the offerings of right-wing extremists. The American 
discourse first led to a governmental reaction in the 
form of the Communications Decency Act of 1996; 
which, nevertheless, was seen as incompatible with 
the First Amendment by the Supreme Court and 
deemed unconstitutional in 1997. It is exactly in this 
political context that PICS were conceived as an 
alternative. German politics considered a similar 
institutional structure of control as has been estab-
lished for monitoring the distribution of youth-
endangering material in the 1950ies, whereas that 
institutional structure should be completed by legal 
regulations for Internet providers (see Schily 2000). 
The Bertelsmann Concept is a response to this 
proposal. Resnick and Miller, as well as the Bertels-
mann Stiftung, argue for rating, filtering and block-
ing as alternatives to governmental intervention. 
Analogous to older debates about the control of the 
media, they all focus their arguments on an individ-
ual’s freedom of communication, which they claim 
must be protected. They see this as only being 
possible through the strengthening of the power of 
those utilizing communication—through a user-
empowerment—which is precisely what is made 
feasible by filtering technology (Resnick/Miller 1996; 
Memorandum 2000, 44).  
Exactly by this argument, however, prove these 
concepts themselves to be at least partially deter-
mined by normative preconceptions. With their 
focus an individual’s freedom of communication, 
they place themselves, moreover, directly on an 
ethical basis of legitimacy. Over and above that, this 
basis is clearly culturally specific: the freedom of 
individuals to pursue their own concepts of happi-
ness and with that their needs of communication, is 
an idea particular to western nations—
predominantly found in Europe and North America. 
The idea belongs to the ethical focus of the project 
of modernity, specifically its emphasizing the sub-
ject’s autonomy. It is, furthermore, directly con-
nected with modernity’s program of democratization 
which represents the political realization of freedom 
and autonomy. Therefore, both concepts are neither 
culturally independent nor do they form an ethically 
abstinent foundation for a plurality of standards. 
This option for plurality—specifically intercultural 
plurality—intricate to both concepts cannot be 
detached from thoughts of autonomy and the ethi-
cal core of modernity: only in and where autonomy 
is established, plurality can be substantially under-
stood and delimited as a legitimate phenomenon. If 
a concept like that of the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
explicitly identifies the autonomy of individuals as 
such, the right to freedom of expression, and a 
variety of other ideas—that is a plurality—as the 
basis of the substantiation of said concept itself 
(Memorandum 2000, 44), it can be considered no 
longer a functional equivalent to ethics. On the 
contrary, that concept grounds its own necessity 
within the framework of a modern, ethical notion 
and attempts to develop its structure out of this 
ethical conception. Concepts like the one outlined 
above, then, do not make the question of an ethics 
of the Internet redundant, rather such a question 
shows itself as being implicit to the process itself. 
For here it is apparent that the question whether 
one or the other of the aforementioned concepts are 
capable of establishing a consensus is not merely a 
consensus pertaining to a pragmatic solution, but 
rather one that pertains at least just as much to 
confirming a consensus for the ethics contained 
therein. 
Now one may wish to by and large subordinate the 
discussion of consensus-capability within German 
and American spheres—in spite of the clash over the 
boundaries of freedom in the debate between 
liberalism and communitarianism. Yet even in this 
case, the two concepts offer more problems than 
solutions—and here they are firmly ethical problems. 
The autonomy of individuals (standing as the princi-
ple upon which the concepts are based) and free-
doms of the media and communication (which the 
concepts seek to protect) are actually endangered 
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by these proposals. This comes first of all into effect 
starting with the fact that the autonomy of the users 
is not presented as the capacity of discernment 
regarding the Internet and its offerings; rather it is 
centrally relocated in the technical possibility of 
automated negative selection. Media competence 
hereby shrivels to the mere choice of a particular 
selection machine. This forms the most critical point 
of all, because—at least for the concept of the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung—not simply the safeguarding 
of children and youth is proposed, but also the 
shielding of adults from content which they do not 
wish to be confronted with (Memorandum 2000, 
44). To achieve this, the self-protection from a link 
or web-address should not in any way require 
reflection, but should be accomplished automati-
cally. Furthermore, this self-curtailing of maturity 
can go awry by the determinations of others, espe-
cially when the suggestion is followed to retain the 
default settings—chosen by a company— during the 
purchasing of the computer. Media competence, as 
reflective and discerning use of the media, is not 
furthered in this way, but rather its development is 
undermined and disabled. 
Furthermore several more technically conditioned 
difficulties having disadvantageous effects can 
unfold. Labeling is essential for both proposals: that 
is the self-identification of websites and documents 
on the Internet by authors and operators. This, 
having to be realized with the provided basic vo-
cabulary of 30 to 60 words (Balkin 2000, 266), 
means the introduction of a Procrustes’ Bed into the 
process of description and the coercion of routine 
self-distortion; all the more so, since the vocabulary 
is to be split up into several criteria—like: content; 
genre; information desired by users; and the attrib-
utes utilized like text, pictures, animation, etc. 
(Waltermann 2000, 543)—and actually shrunk for 
characteristics like content. Similar distortions for 
the construction of filtering templates should be 
expected, if they work simply with a combination of 
these vocabulary elements. In this light, it appears 
questionable whether the rate of incorrect block-
ings—reaching up to 80%—of current filter systems 
can be minimized effectively (Haselton 2000, 
Weinberg 1997). Over and above that the question 
remains unanswered, how a basic vocabulary is 
possible in a transnational context: one which helps 
to avoid narrow, culturally specific notions as well as 
the domination of American conceptions of 
´decency´ (Chalaby 1998, 39). These possible 
distortions could disturb the fragile freedom of 
communication—especially when this occurs in the 
pre-installation phase due to a third party—against 
the wishes and beyond the notice of the individual 
users. 
The dangers to freedom of communication are 
sharpened further by the foreseen hotline system 
proposed in the Bertelsmann concept. For example 
in the case of the German institution for monitoring 
the distribution of youth-endangering media 
(Bundespruefstelle fuer jugendgefaehrdende 
Schriften) only a certain few institutions and political 
representatives are invested with the protection of 
the youth—and, therefore, can file a legitimate 
grievance—whereas with the hotline all private 
citizens may lodge complaints. The German model 
concerning institutional monitoring of youth-
endangering material envisages a type of pre-
selection, restricting possible grievances through 
expertise. Yet in the hotline system, all matters of 
folly and unknowledgeable interest can affect their 
influence on the process. The system, then, looks 
ethically precarious, because, in this case, those 
interested in the restriction of communication can 
achieve their end, while representing neither those 
affected (namely, those interested in using the 
Internet), nor even the majority of the population. 
The basis for this objection is to be found in the fact 
that in a system that exclusively focuses on the 
voices of those seeking limitations and demanding 
restrictions, those who do not desire such restric-
tions have no voice by definition. On behalf of 
freedom of the media it thus appears vital that calls 
for limitations of communication ought to be re-
stricted and filtered, too. 
Regarding the hotline system, this is not even the 
end of the story. Concurrently, the danger exists 
that marginal groups could use the system in order 
to push through their particular programs of restric-
tion in an organized fashion. Such behavior is not 
unknown in the history of organized media criticism 
(Hausmanninger 1992; 2000). The strategic use of 
institutional and legal conditions, in this way, plays 
an increasingly serious roll. In the American sphere, 
the acronym SLAPP—Strategic Lawsuit Against 
Public Participation—has already been established to 
name such legally undesirable but hardly unavoid-
able conduct (UNESCO 1999, 75). The organized 
criticism of the media by marginal pressure groups 
poses problems even for the proposed self-control 
measures: where the emergence of complaints wins 
massive attention—relegating the masses interested 
in use of Internet offerings to silence—also grows 
the pressure to install self-control mechanisms, 
whose seriousness is proven through measures of 
limitation, which correspond to the complaints 
raised. Instead of the desired user-empowerment 
IJIE 
International Journal of Information Ethics Vol.  1  (06/2004) 
 
Thomas Hausmanninger: Controlling the Net 24 
we may find the hegemonic influence of organized 
factions to impose restrictions. With regard to that 
possibility, the UNESCO fittingly speaks of a ‘privati-
zation of censorship’ (1999, 74). 
Lastly, it cannot be ruled out that the instruments 
for rating, filtering, and blocking could dovetail 
against the inherent and principal intention of both 
concepts and, by the use of governmental control, 
be used to completely abolish the autonomy of 
individuals. Feasibly, the PICS-platform and filtering 
system could be installed by Internet providers and 
imbued, for example, with political criteria. Un-
wanted and counter to their intention, both concepts 
actually provide instruments for non-democratic 
political systems. Seen through these objections, the 
proposals fall into what discourse ethics, in reliance 
upon linguistic pragmatics, calls a contradiction in 
performance—a contradiction between intended 
content and actual conduct: in this case, between 
the goal of the concept and the possible effects of 
its implementation. 
Towards Ethics for the Net 
Rating, filtering, and blocking alone cannot replace 
Internet ethics. Additionally, despite the objections 
outlined above, ethical regulation does not appear 
superfluous. Even where we are not forced to 
decide on a particular ethical theory for the system-
atic foundation needed for this regulation, the above 
sections make us aware of the factual necessity of 
such. Yet all this begs the question, in which way 
such a regulation can be reached. In order to an-
swer this question, several requirements for such a 
regulation have to be kept in mind. 
First, any ethical regulation of the Internet must 
correspond to the plurality and diversity of the 
world’s cultures and notions of morality. Were this 
not the case, the regulation would tend towards 
cultural imperialism on a theoretical level, while 
practically it could not be implemented in the decen-
tralized structure of the Internet. Especially the 
American and European cultures ought to be quite 
sensitive towards culturally imperialistic moves: 
They all embody not only the right to freedom of 
individuals and groups but more so the right for 
these individuals and groups to differ in a free and 
unmolested way from one another. Diversity and 
plurality are nothing less than the cornerstones of 
their free societies. Specifically European and Ameri-
can Philosophy furthermore has—under the influ-
ence of deconstructionism—developed a sense for 
difference and its significance in any concept of 
justice. Respecting difference thus has become a 
vital element of morality. Any concept negating the 
diversity and opting for forced uniformity would thus 
appear morally precarious. Contemporary American 
and European philosophy therefore should not seek 
solutions in the realm of information ethics opposed 
to difference and plurality. These solutions could not 
be sustained very long, either. Where an ethical 
concept does not respect and incorporate plurality 
and diversity, where it does not bespeak the various 
convictions of those individuals who are to live with 
it, looms the threat of its being subverted and 
undermined. Regarding the Internet, this result 
obtaining is especially plausible. On the other hand, 
an ethical concept must be capable of some consen-
sus. That is why the outlined concepts of rating, 
filtering, and blocking also rely upon the readiness 
of individuals to restrict their behavior themselves 
and their corroboration in the institutional realization 
of censorship, while not relying upon a purely insti-
tutional carrying out thereof. As the history of the 
repressive protection of youth demonstrates, in this 
case, repression may alter the ways of obtaining 
certain banned media products, but not really their 
acquisition and reception by young people in a 
sufficient manner and to a sufficient degree (Vogel-
gesang 1991). (For the same reason, of course, the 
aforementioned danger of the censuring use of 
filtering instruments by non-democratic states is a 
bit moderated.) The necessary consensus therefore 
needs to be of a quality, that takes difference and 
diversity into account and makes them part of the 
consensus itself. 
Second, the ethical regulation of the Internet must 
correspond to its various spheres of communication 
and activity, which form a diversity of its own. 
Norms for political discourse and the actions of 
NGOs differ from those needed for the mating and 
dating in Internet chatrooms. These, in turn, must 
be differentiated from the norms needed for eco-
nomic communications and transactions, etc. The 
more the functions of the Internet differentiate 
themselves along the lines of social systems—and 
develop this differentiation further—the stronger the 
demand will become for the development Internet-
specific ethics for each realm. This feature is, by the 
way, neither covered by rating and filtering, nor do 
the proposals even intend to address it. Third, the 
ethical regulation of the Internet requires transna-
tional, legal support: above all, in enabling the 
effective control of illegal content and other actions. 
Fourth, and finally, Internet ethics must be supple-
mented by a Net-external non-repressive, educa-
tionally oriented youth protection, aimed at the 
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generation of individual and autonomous media 
competence. 
Attempts to establish ethical regulations that would 
take into account the plurality and diversity of the 
global nature of the Internet can, first of all, take 
cues from endeavors to ground similar notions of 
morality. Despite all the diversity and differences of 
cultures it appears possible to note some basic 
similarities in the multitude of ethical convictions 
around the globe. On empirical grounds, that has 
been shown for example by Hans Küng (1997) and 
his Project World Ethos: obviously the diverse 
ethical concepts converse in some basic norms, 
values and rules—even though these may not 
always have the same significance or authority in 
these various concepts. Similar to the endeavors in 
the field of substantiating basic human rights, 
Küng´s efforts show, that it is apparently simpler to 
locate comparable moral norms than identical or 
comparable discourses for the substantiation of 
these norms. (Whereas from a European viewpoint 
it certainly appears possible to propose a meta-
theory to explain these convergences, and it may 
even be feasible to ground this in the self-reflection 
of a rational, moral self-consciousness [Hausman-
ninger 1994]. But this European viewpoint is not 
necessarily transposable into any other culture.). So, 
in order to generate a convergence of foundational 
ideas about norms, the unification of all theoretical 
conceptions is not really essential—the ways of 
justification and substantiation may remain plural 
whereas the convergences pose sort of a substantia-
tion and justification of its own. 
The reasons for this become clearer when consider-
ing the varied justifications and substantiations of 
human rights; to this end, advocates can utilize a 
wide range of religious and ethical lines of argumen-
tation including: Kantian, subject-oriented; discourse 
ethical; justice-based; utilitarian; contract theoreti-
cal; or neo-Aristotelian approaches. Efforts to organ-
ize similar basic moral conceptions can be further 
developed into something like John Rawls’ overlap-
ping consensus. This forms the starting-point for a 
world ethos (Weltethos) of the Internet. The term 
´overlapping´ on the other hand takes into account 
that the ethos need not be of a ´monolithic´ sort. 
On the contrary it ought to be sort of a partially 
connected, partially overlapping and partially dis-
crete nature. Furthermore the overlapping part may 
be of different urgency and relevance in different 
cultures. Thus the world ethos of the Internet could 
form in itself sort of a net—and thus embody differ-
ence, diversity and plurality. Looming conflicts 
between the discrete parts of it could be softened 
by the regional character of these, which is made 
possible also on the net because of its segmentation 
(see below). At the same time this diverse and 
internally plural ethos can be considered sound, if it 
allows for the ordering of foundational ethical reflec-
tions. Each part of the ethos needs to be able to 
substantiate its form and content and thus be po-
tentially criticizable. The intersection of the sundry 
ethical conceptions could be viewed as something 
like the core of the world ethos of the Internet. 
Analogous to the process through which the truth 
content of religious notions is strengthened by their 
convergence in several religions—the more in-
stances the better—and anchored in their rational 
reflective concepts, that intersection attests to the 
especially well-grounded rightness of that core and 
also the related ethical convictions. 
By looking for an overlapping consensus further-
more a normative instance is gained which allows 
for the introduction of the ethically fundamental 
difference between moral and immoral: concepts 
that directly oppose the core cannot be called ethi-
cal anymore. Thus the difference between legitimate 
and illegitimate elements of plurality and diversity 
can be noted. Immoral notions can be labeled as 
such and will not—as with them the ideologies of 
totalitarian systems—find a place in this overlapping 
consensus. They would compromise the possible 
establishment of a consistent, ethical foundation; 
not least because they are inclined to resort to 
methods of repression, terror, and torture in order 
to maintain their existence. Thus these systems 
demarcate the boundary of legitimacy for plurality 
and diversity. At the same time, the process leading 
to this world ethos of the Internet could ultimately 
play a roll in transnational processes, which could 
lead to the final disappearance of said political 
systems. 
The factually given segmentation of communication 
on the Internet could itself be made fruitful for the 
search for this ethos and also for the creation of its 
specific, diverse and plural concretions. The entire 
world is not in point of fact in communication with 
itself on the Internet, but rather the communication 
falls into several strands. In contrast to other media 
of communication to this point, Internet communica-
tion tends to have a much stronger international 
component. Moreover, while the potential for the 
global networking of communication always exists, 
there is also the chance that one strand will merge 
with another. Nevertheless, certain barriers stand in 
the way of this possibility; in part the same obsta-
cles that cause the segmentation, as well as provide 
pathways for the channeling, of the streams of 
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communication. Three such barriers appear espe-
cially relevant for our inquiry here: the multiplicity of 
languages and their written form; the IT- and tele-
communications-infrastructure; and the dominant 
interests of users. 
Admittedly, this segmentation of the Internet is not 
always helpful or desirable—in particular, when this 
is accompanied by the exclusion of poorer regions of 
the world from global communication. Yet, some 
elements of the segmentation are quite useful. The 
factor of segmentation, for example, brings Anglo-
Saxon and democratic, human-rights oriented 
societies closer to each other. In this strand, an 
understanding concerning an ethos of human-rights 
can certainly be achieved without a lot of qualms 
over cultural imperialism. The effects of localization 
can support a focus on specifics—for example, on 
various African ethics—and on the one hand make 
this an issue for discussion, while on the other hand 
lend veracity to diverse and plural viewpoints. At the 
same time, however, this localization remains em-
bedded in global communication and must not come 
across as ghettoization. Hereby, a tie-in with a world 
ethos of the Internet appears possible. The plurality 
of specific notions of morality, as well as the seg-
mentation of them along the interests of the users, 
are both helpful to that end. By following the spe-
cific segmentations of the users along the lines of 
shared interests or/and ethnic, local etc. features it 
is possible to establish specific moral codes which 
belong to specific groups—for example religious 
groups—as ´group-morals´ which may be the 
morals of even transnational communities, like (once 
again) religious communities. These may form 
specific communicative segments in which group-
specific moral convictions are heeded. At the same 
time, this process must, from the beginning, be 
compatible with a comprehensive ethical frame-
work—namely, the world ethos of the Internet—and 
avoide ghettoization and other missteps. In the 
joining of this segmentation with the global-nature 
of the communication, the Internet even offers the 
chance to reach beyond previous efforts to establish 
an ethical framework for all of humanity—this 
global-nature is a constant challenge to be faced by 
every user, yet without denying them the privilege 
to greater specificity or even exit opportunities. 
Not only the plurality, but also the differentiation of 
communication and action on the Internet must be 
taken into account. Ethical regulations that corre-
spond to specific areas have to take their place 
along side these moralities. For instance, the in-
creasing presence of business on the Internet 
makes necessary a business ethics for the Internet. 
The already existent ethics for specific realms of 
action in the real world could be borrowed from in 
this case. Yet simultaneously, the Internet poses 
new difficulties: particularly regarding one’s dealings 
with data and information—which are much easier 
to ‘acquire’ on the Internet than in the real world. As 
regards privacy policies, the groundwork has already 
been laid. Furthermore, the Internet offers pros-
pects for the establishment of moral standards for 
global, economic activities—and for their reflected, 
ethical grounding—which until now have not been 
possible. This continuing failure to found a frame-
work for global rules remains one of business ethics’ 
central problems. This shortcoming can be partially 
substituted for at the ethical level or by institutional 
self-constraint—e.g. industry agreements, codes of 
conduct, etc. As Karl Homann and Franz Blome-
Drees emphasize (1992, 131-135), such substitu-
tions, however, are time and again confronted with 
the situation of competition: economic actions must 
be rent producing. The serious opportunities for 
moral forerunners are to be primarily found, where 
such substitutions are image-building and profitable 
(Homann/Blome-Drees 1992, 137). 
Image is, however, a product of communication. For 
that reason, in communicative settings like the 
Internet, institutionalized self-constraint and ethos-
specified actions have a greater chance of coming 
about. On the Internet, businesses and even entire 
industries can better explain and justify their policies 
and actions to consumers—even changing policies to 
fit consumer demands—building up their image and 
winning the preference of certain groups. Over and 
above that, the communicative space that is the 
Internet compels a closer relationship between 
companies and their moral policies, because the 
next firm is but a mouse click away. Not only does 
the comparability of offers grow, but the moral 
standards of economic activity do as well. The 
competition for the best morals that develops out of 
this can conveniently influence the global business 
ethics for economic exchange on the Internet, as 
well as have an impact beyond cyber-space. This 
goes similarly for other ethical spheres and the 
cultivation of moral standards: in science, religious 
communities, and suchlike.  
The necessity of rules and laws in the real world, 
though, draws attention to the fact that the flourish-
ing activity of all working together cannot be guar-
anteed by morals and ethics alone. Therefore, a 
comparable legal support for the moral and ethical 
regulation of activities and communication on the 
Internet appears necessary. The legal regulations of 
individual countries and cultures differentiate them-
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selves here, as does the perceived relationship 
between morality and law. Once again, we stand 
before a situation entailing plurality and difference. 
For this, the Bertelsmann concept provides an 
appropriate strategy, even if all of its elements are 
not found satisfactory. Global framework agree-
ments are indispensable: especially those that 
incorporate the world’s legal cultures with each 
other, while providing for the effective control of 
criminality. With this, the basic idea at the beginning 
of the article comes into force: namely, the notion 
that the prosecution of punishable actions on the 
Internet or other means of communication should 
take place in, and within the legal structure of, the 
country wherein the actions took place or where the 
information is stored. From here, one can see the 
growth of avenues for bettered transnational coop-
eration. On the other hand, from an ethical perspec-
tive—even for illegal content—it is not always desir-
able that the most rigid notions of morality prevail. 
Let the difference between the democratic nations 
of Germany and the United States regarding the 
treatment of a traditional medium like film serve as 
an example: films that in Germany are banned, and 
have therefore been objects of criminal prosecution, 
in the USA have received a place in the Museum of 
Modern Arts. In such a case, the differences be-
tween the legal cultures can be viewed feasibly as a 
constructive provocation producing critical reflection 
about the more rigid regulation. For the reasons 
mentioned above, a hotline-system taking over the 
monitoring responsibilities for an area like illegal 
content appears problematic at best. It would be 
more appropriate to entrust this function, then as 
now, to the judicial and executive branches of 
government. 
Lastly, we turn our attention to the problem of the 
protection of youth. One the one hand, the related 
anxieties overshoot the situation in reality to a 
certain degree here—up to now, a phenomenon 
which has accompanied all new forms of media. On 
the other hand, the endangerment of youth is not 
an ontologically-fixed, but rather a dynamic, cultur-
ally-specific concept. As above, the according ac-
tions to protect the youth should be oriented around 
the world’s plurality and diversity, and their repro-
duction on the Internet. In addition, experience with 
regards to traditional media and endangerment of 
youth from extra-medial sources is waiting to be 
utilized. One of the central experiences, though one 
does not always eagerly take note of it, is the al-
ready mentioned fact that repressive means of 
protection—the overly protective educational at-
tempt to guarantee a valuable socialization through 
the total absence of youth-endangering material—
does not adequately lead to success. This insight 
has much longer been in force in media education 
theory, than in politics, law, and the institutions 
controlling social communication. Therefore, media 
education theory focuses foremost on teaching 
knowledgeable behavior. Regarding contact with 
certain forms of media this means supporting and 
encouraging the development of autonomous media 
competence. Institutions responsible for the areas of 
upbringing and education cannot achieve this alone. 
In upbringing, a culture must foster maturity: a 
maturity that needs to be anchored in the family, 
social groups, and religious and ethical communities. 
It is here, furthermore, that new models of the 
localization of civil society could prove useful, as 
their attention is directed more strongly toward the 
significance of the local quality of life for social 
togetherness. An upbringing that results in mature 
contact with media forms, then, a type of ´filter´ of 
its own: albeit one that is more effective than the 
technical kind. It is a ´filter´ that is embedded in 
the ethos of the individual and thus makes up an 
essential element of the capacity for self-selection of 
what is appropriate. Through this, many of the 
dangers that accompany certain offerings on the 
Internet can be more efficiently combated, than 
through repressive means. This fact may actually 
contribute to an easing of tensions: youth endanger-
ing subject matter neither makes up the bulk con-
tent on the Internet, nor did it appear for the first 
time in societies through the creation of the Inter-
net. One has always had to impart lessons to chil-
dren and youths—that they should not speak to 
strangers; that not every product of the media is 
meant and appropriate for consumption by young 
people; that lies and deceit come part and parcel 
with this world—so must they now also be taught 
how to deal with the Internet and its content. And 
as until now teaching children these other lessons 
has not been futile, we need not assume that the 
challenges of the present are insurmountable.  
If these paths to moral standards for activities and 
communication on the Internet successfully develop 
and encourage media competence, then the more 
fascinating possibilities of the Internet can be fur-
ther cultivated. Then as now, it is important to 
remember that the Internet is not something sepa-
rate from the real world, but rather embedded in it. 
It then remains the responsibility of citizens of this 
real world to establish a structure enabling the 
flourishing of communication and other activities on 
the Internet. 
Translation from German by Dominic Marcellino, 
Arkansas, partially rewritten by the author. 
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Printed Versus Internet Plagiarism: A Study of Students' Perception 
Abstract: 
Recent studies have shown a growing tendency among students to commit plagiarism, especially from online 
information sources. This unpleasant phenomenon has a far- reaching impact on both the scientific world and 
the information society. The present study aimed to examine students' perceptions toward acts of plagiarism, 
in order to explore whether plagiarism from internet sources is perceived differently than plagiarism from 
printed sources. Findings of the present study indicate that students perceive plagiarism offences from online 
sources as significantly less dishonest than similar offences using printed sources. Possible implications of 
these findings are discussed and several conclusions are noted. Analysis of these findings from a broad 
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Introduction 
The term "plagiarism" is used to describe a wide 
range of acts (Oliphant, 2002).  One well-accepted 
definition in literature is "the presentation of an-
other's words or ideas as your own" (Babbie, 1998, 
1). 
The term, deriving from the Latin root Plagiarius, 
which means ‘a kidnapper,’ was first used by Mar-
tial, a Roman poet in the first century A.D. (Kolich, 
1983). Traditionally, literary theft was compared to 
stealing a child or a slave, highlighting the powerful 
relationship between artistic and biological creations 
(Greenacre, 1978). Since the 18 century, the term 
plagiarism is restricted excusively to literary theft 
(Garfield, 1980). 
Howard (2001) discusses four types of academic 
plagiarism: (a) submission of a paper that was 
written by other student; (b) patchwriting – copying 
sentences from a source and mixing them with your 
own words without attribution; (c) failure to cite 
sources, and; (d) failure to use quotation marks. 
Amongst these categories, the last two is considered 
most common among students (Evans, 2000). 
Wadja-Jonston, Handal, Brawer & Fabricatore 
(2001) surveyed 246 graduate students and found 
that 55% admitted to "not copying word for word 
but changing the wording slightly from an original 
source while writing a paper" and 16% to "copying 
word for word from an original source in a paper 
and not using quotation marks". Less than 5% 
confirmed that they submitted a paper which had 
been copied from another student or purchased 
from “paper mills”. Of the 40 academically dishonest 
behaviors which were examined in their study, 
students perceived the prevalence rates of the first 
expression as the most frequent. 
Until the mid 90's, expressions of plagiarism were 
limited to printed sources such as books, encyclope-
dias, newspapers and articles. The internet, how-
ever, opened a window of opportunity for diverse 
and inventive acts of plagiarism (Stebelman, 1998). 
The internet grants students access to vast amounts 
of information. It allows them to complete their 
assignments by copying and pasting different seg-
ments of information (Galus, 2002). Willems (2003) 
reported that recent research shows that the major-
ity of students indeed perceived the internet as an 
auxiliary tool that enables them to prepare assign-
ments "as quickly and painlessly as possible with 
minimal effort and minimal engagement" (p. 28). 
McMurtry (2001) demonstrated three popular meth-
ods of using the internet to commit plagiarism. The 
first method, which is considered the easiest, in-
cludes locating appropriate web sites using a search 
engine, copying relevant texts and pasting them into 
an essay. The second method is comprised of 
receiving papers prepared by friends or students 
from other universities through online 
communications channels such as e-mail or internet 
forums. The third and harshest method is 
downloading essays from online "sites that collect 
and distributes papers on the web, either free or for 
a fee," also known as “paper mills.” (ibid, p. 37). 
All the aforementioned methods illustrate Bodi's 
(1998) argument. Compared to information on 
paper, online information has become much more 
vulnerable to plagiarism due to technological options 
of modifying texts, moving sections from one place 
to another and separating sections from an original 
text as a whole. 
The main cause of internet plagiarism, according to 
the literature, is the assumption that the internet is 
a public domain and therefore, information on the 
internet may be used without attribution (Groark, 
Oblinger & Choa, 2001; Oliphant, 2002; Thompson, 
2003). 
Devoss & Rosati (2002) suggested several reasons 
why students use the internet to plagiarize. One of 
the reasons concerns the ease and popularity of 
copy-paste actions, which are considered natural 
operations in computerized environments. Another 
reason related to the fact that many web sites, as 
opposed to printed sources, fail to note the author’s 
name. Finally, the lack of knowledge in dealing with 
these situations leads to plagiarism acts. 
Freedman (1998) opined that alongside its numer-
ous advantages, the internet is seen by many as a 
key factor in the propagation of the plagiarism 
plague. In his opinion, however, placing exclusive 
responsible for the increase of plagiarism rates on a 
new technology is like "countenancing one's own 
failure to recognize and reward originality" (p. 40). 
The main purpose of the present study was to 
investigate the differences between plagiarism acts 
from printed sources and plagiarism acts from 
internet sources. Examining these differences allow 
us to clarify whether the source of information has 
indeed an influence on students' perception regard-
ing plagiarism acts. 
IJIE 
International Journal of Information Ethics Vol.  1  (06/2004) 
 
Shifra Baruchson-Arbib & Eti Yaari: Printed Versus Internet plagiarism 31 
Method 
Sample 
Participants were students, who had at least one 
year of academic experience (i.e., were registered 
for second-year classes at the B.A level or higher). 
In order to ensure proper representation of the 
existing diversity of university majors and academic 
levels, participants were selected randomly after a 
multi-stage sampling procedure (faculties – majors – 
academic levels – courses). 
A total of 284 students completed the questionnaire. 
The average age of respondents was 27.7 years 
(range: 20-52). The sample was comprised of 215 
females and 69 males. Students from two faculties 
were examined: 177 students from the Faculty of 
Social Sciences and 107 students from the Faculty of 
Humanities. The entire sample was comprised of 
154 students at the B.A level and 130 students at 
the M.A level. 
Survey instrument 
A questionnaire was specifically constructed for the 
purpose of this study, following Roig's (1997) "Pla-
giarism Knowledge Survey" (PKS). The question-
naire comprised four items of identical structure. 
Each section contained a small paragraph taken 
from an original source including its bibliographic 
details, followed by a plagiarized version of the 
source, taken from a student's essay. A plagiarized 
version means that the student used the materials 
while committing plagiarism. Illustrations from two 
classes of plagiarism were used in the present 
study. In the “word for word” illustration, text was 
copied from the source without quotation marks. In 
the “paraphrasing” illustration, ideas from the 
source were used with no mention of the author's 
name. Two descriptions were taken from printed 
sources and the other two from internet sources. 
In conclusion, each item was comprised of a unique 
combination of an information source (printed / 
internet) and its student (plagiarized) version ("word 
for word" / "paraphrasing"). 
After reading each item, respondents were re-
quested to express an opinion regarding whether 
the author of the student version acted according to 
the acceptable citation rules. Respondents marked 
one of three options below: 
1. "Yes" – the student version is consistent with 
accepted citation rules.  
2. "Can't decide" – I am unable to determine. 
3. "No" – the student version does not meet ac-
cepted citation rules. 
In addition, participants who marked "No" were 
asked to explain their answers. Since the aim of this 
study was to explore student's perceptions only, 
data collected from this segment was not entered to 
the present research report. 
Procedure 
Questionnaires were distributed during class hours, 
to ensure both full concentration and adequate time 
to complete the questionnaires. 
First, a short introduction about the aim of the 
research, which was presented as testing the stu-
dents' citation habits, has been said to the partici-
pant. Then, questionnaires were distributed, accom-
panied by oral instructions on completion.  The 
questionnaire’s anonymity and the fact that data 
would be used exclusively for research purposes 
was repeatedly noted. 
Results 
Perceptions of the differences between plagiarism 
from printed sources and plagiarism from internet 
sources were examined by analyzing participants’ 
perceptions of the consistency of the students’ 
version with accepted rules of citation. Figure 1 
separately presents frequencies for every plagiarism 
category, by source medium. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of students' perception for each of the four descriptions 
As shown in Figure 1, most respondents believed 
they were able to determine whether the student's 
version was or was not consistent with accepted 
rules of citation. The minority preferred to mark 
"can't decide". Furthermore, approximately 40% of 
the respondents marked "yes" in the first three 
items (“word for word”-print; “paraphrasing” – print 
and internet) and approximately 65% marked "yes" 
in the fourth item  ("word for word" – internet). This 
indicates a poor knowledge of the accepted rules of 
citation. 
Next, a general perception score was calculated for 
each respondent, by enumerating the number of 
times the answer "no" was marked for each source 
text. A score of "0" indicated that both items were 
perceived as consistent with accepted rules of 
citation, the score "1" indicated that only one item 
was perceived to be inconsistent with these rules 
and the score "2" indicated that both items were 
perceived to be inconsistent with accepted rules of 
citation.  Due to the ordinal nature of the general 
perception score, a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
rank test was conducted to determine whether there 
was a difference between printed and internet 
sources. Results of the analysis revealed a signifi-
cant difference in perception (z=-7.04, N=284, 
p<.001). Specifically, more participants tended to 
perceive the student's version as inconsistent with 
accepted rules of citation when the source text used 
was a printed source (M=.99, SS=100) compared to 
an internet sources (M=.64, SS=21). 
In addition, the differences between sources were 
examined by comparing the participant's perception 
separately for each item of plagiarism.  
The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable 
(1=marking "yes"24, 2= marking "no") supported 
the use of McNemar tests for repeated measures. 
Table 1 presents results of respondents’ perceptions 
and the McNemar's χ2 results. 
                                               
24 Because of the small amount of respondents who 
marked "unable to decide" (compared to the other 
categories), this category was united with the 
"yes" category. The rational for this act was that 
both categories represent the same first impres-
sion: although an example of plagiarism, the stu-
dent’s version was not perceived as inconsistent 
with accepted rules of citation. 
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 Printed source 
 
 "yes" "no" 
χ 2 (1) 
"word for word"     
"yes" 132 91 
internet source 
"no" 13 48 
57.01 
*** 
"paraphrasing"     
"yes" 116 46 
internet source 
"no" 25 97 
5.63 * 
Table 1. A comparison of perceived correct-
ness of Plagiarism expression between 
printed sources and internet sources (N=284) 
Legend: * p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001 
Table 1 indicates that the number of participants 
who found students’ versions modified from print 
sources as inconsistent with citation rules and found 
students’ version of internet sources as consistent 
with these rules, was significantly higher than the 
number of respondents with converse answers (i.e., 
"no" in internet sources and "yes" in printed 
sources). In other words, the modification of print 
source texts was judged more harshly compared to 
perceptions regarding modifications of the same 
type, of internet source texts.  
In order to explore these differences more thor-
oughly, we investigated the possible influence 
respondents’ age on perception, using a simple 
logistic regression. Separate analyses were con-
ducted for each unique combination of plagiarized 
version ("paraphrasing"/"word for word") and infor-
mation source (printed/internet). 
Of the four combinations which were examined, only 
"paraphrasing of a printed source” yielded a signifi-
cant overall model (LR Chi2 (1)=7.32, p<.01), 
whereas the other combinations were not statisti-
cally significant ("paraphrasing of an internet 
source”: LR Chi2 (1)=.63, p>.05 ; "word for word of 
-printed source”: LR Chi2 (1)=1.01, p>.05 ; "word 
for word of an internet source”: LR Chi2 (1)=.15, 
p>.05). 
The results suggested that respondents’ age was a 
significant predictor of their perceptions of the 
student's version  characterized by  the use of ideas 
from printed sources,  with no mention of the au-
thor's name (Wald=6.92, B=.052, p<.01). The 'Odd 
ratio' for the age variable was 1.05, with a 95% 
confidence interval of [1.01, 1.09]. This suggests 
that for every additional year of age, the probability 
of perceiving the student's version as inconsistent 
with accepted rules of citation, increase by 5%. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The present study offers empirical evidence on the 
differential perceptions of plagiarism from internet 
and printed sources. The findings of the present 
study all confirm that plagiarism from internet 
sources is perceived as less dishonest than a similar 
act of plagiarism using a printed source. 
It should be noted that there are very few studies 
dealing explicitly with the differences between 
printed and internet plagiarism. These studies refer 
primarily to students’ self-reported commission of 
plagiarism and their perceptions concerning the 
prevalence of plagiarism by other students on 
campus. In this context, the literature reported that 
students do not distinguish between types of infor-
mation sources and commit plagiarism equally from 
both sources (e.g., Scanlon & Neumann, 2002; 
Scribner, 2003). 
Nonetheless, several theoretical ideas may clarify 
our findings. 
The most common argument for internet plagiarism 
is related to the widespread opinion among students 
that information on the internet belongs to the 
public domain, the use of which is unrestricted and 
requires no citation (Moeck, 2002; Oliphant, 2002). 
According to this approach, different perceptions of   
printed and internet plagiarism stem from the belief 
that the transfer of information to the internet 
renders the content free and available for anyone to 
copy or use as they please. 
In our opinion, this assumption results from the 
highly accessible nature of the internet as an infor-
mation source, available to almost anyone, any-
where at anytime. On the other hand, access to 
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printed sources requires a specific location, where 
sources are stored, sometimes in a limited degree of 
availability. Furthermore, access to such sources 
itself may be restricted.   
Another argument supporting the perceived differ-
ences between sources is the lack of agreement 
between style guides on the rules of citation for 
internet sources (Auer & krupar, 2001; Oliphant, 
2002). Numerous types of information sources exist 
on the internet (i.e., web sites, discussion groups, e-
mails, etc.) and no uniform code exists regarding 
citation requirements. Lack of knowledge and clarity 
surrounding the issue of citing internet sources may 
also contribute to plagiarism. Furthermore, many 
websites make no mention of the author's name, a 
fact which reinforces the supposition that the infor-
mation has no “official owner.” Parenthetically, it 
should be noted that style guides allow the notation 
of the organization name or the page title instead of 
the author's name, in the case of internet sources 
(Thompson, 2003). 
In the present study, we also found that the partici-
pants' age had an influence on their perceptions 
regarding the use of “ideas without mention of the 
author's name" from printed sources, although this 
influence was not statistically significant in similar 
examples of plagiarism from internet sources. In 
other words, the differences in perceptions between 
the younger and the older generations in respect of 
the need to mention the author's name when using 
a printed source were discernible, while both gen-
erations held similar attitudes towards internet 
sources. A possible explanation for these findings is 
the lack of clarity, shared by all age groups, regard-
ing the legal status of the online content as intellec-
tual property. As for printed sources, the present 
findings support the argument that the older gen-
eration holds an awareness of the importance of 
proper citation and the concept that  ideas belong to 
the person who wrote them (Community College 
Week, 2003).  
In conclusion, the findings of the present study 
suggested that students distinguish printed and 
internet sources and perceive the information on the 
internet as bona-vacantia and free for use. This 
emphasizes the need to treat potential information 
sources separately in research, in order to gain a full 
understanding of the phenomenon. It is also essen-
tial to: a) perfect students' insights regarding the 
ethical use of online information; b) teach them how 
to cite internet sources properly and c) explain the 
importance of protecting intellectual property rights. 
By doing so, universities can reduce the extent of 
plagiarism, and particularly internet plagiarism, 
committed by students. 
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Abstract: 
Rafael Capurro is one of the pioneers of the hermeneutic approach to information studies, especially with 
regard to ethical issues. One of the main goals of his study is to understand “ethos” in the information soci-
ety. Capurro’s ideas concerning the information technology are different from those of Dreyfus although they 
both have hermeneutic viewpoints. The scope of his study is widened in his latest study named “angeletics” 
which means “message studies.” Angeletics, hermeneutics, and mediology are complementary to each other. 
Capurro’s idea concerning ethics in the information age is based on “technologies of the self” which are not 
“act-oriented” but “self-oriented.” It is also expected that interactions between Capurro and Japanese thought 
patterns produce some important contributions to information ethics. 
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Ethos in the Information Society 
Studies on information phenomena from the view-
point of hermeneutics, which was developed by 
Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, can be 
called “hermeneutic information studies” or “herme-
neutic informatics.” Rafael Capurro (1945- ), phi-
losopher and information scientist, is one of the 
pioneers of this field. The issues he addresses are 
quite various: Studies concerning Heidegger, the 
genealogy of information, hermeneutics of informa-
tion retrieval, ethics in the information age, media 
ethics, and digital ontology. Especially his herme-
neutic approach to information ethics is an impor-
tant contribution to this field. 
As is generally known, information ethics is a kind of 
applied ethics such as bioethics and environmental 
ethics. It is a relatively new discipline which ad-
dresses the problems brought by rapidly pervading 
technology and computer networks. It focuses on 
common problems such as privacy protection, 
regulation of potentially injurious contents, respon-
sibility for administrators of the networks or engi-
neers, release of communication records to the 
police, and copyright protection. Media ethics, which 
had been discussed before the Internet became 
popular, is now a part of information ethics.  
Studies on information ethics today often deal with 
these problems through the following approaches: 
How to teach morals to individuals through “formal 
education” processes such as schools, how to estab-
lish ethical professional codes, or how to develop 
regulations or laws. These are efforts to maintain 
ways of regulating society through legislation. It is 
often the case with this way of thinking to separate 
information and its technology from existential 
viewpoints based on the practice of living.  
Given the background of this separation, there is the 
assumption of neutrality with regard to information 
technology. Capurro throws such ideas into doubt 
and deeply redefines the relationship between 
information technology and existential practices of 
living. Technologies are by no means neutral, and it 
is also true of information technology. There is no 
independent substance such as “information itself” 
similar to Kant’s concept of the “thing itself”. Infor-
mation is deeply affected by subjectivity or existen-
tial activities. Capurro insists that information tech-
nology in itself takes on ethical characteristics, 
drawing information and its technology back to the 
field of our daily lives and casting it in multi-layered 
or multi-dimensional contexts.  
Then Capurro turns his analysis to “ethos in the 
information society.” Although his concept of “ethos” 
is difficult to define clearly, it can be regarded as a 
practical attitude which provides the context where 
information technology is located in certain circum-
stances. It is this problem of “ethos” that Capurro 
emphasizes using expressions such as “being inter-
twined” or impartibility between technologies and 
ethics. To investigate ethos in the information 
society means to deal with the dimension where 
information technology and our existential lives are 
intertwined. As a tool that can be used in order to 
grasp this dimension, the viewpoint of “hermeneu-
tics” definitely plays an important role. Thus, the 
concept of “hermeneutic turn” is proposed as the 
paradigm shift to the new informatics to investigate 
ethos in the information society. This is the most 
important framework of Capurro’s argument. 
Capurro’s hermeneutic approach 
Capurro’s hermeneutic turn consists of three key 
concepts: 
Pre-understanding (Vorverständnis) 
This is originally a technical term from Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics. Capurro uses this con-
cept in order to overcome disunion between infor-
mation technology and the practice of our living. For 
example, even a programming language, which 
seems to have no intersection with our lives, makes 
sense only when it is used by those who have pre-
understanding or pre-existing purposes to use it. In 
that sense, it reflects the horizons of meanings. 
Every text as well as daily tools are intertwined in 
the meaning of our living, expecting pre-
understandings in reading or in use. Information 
and its technologies are also inseparably related to 
pre-understandings of developers, managers, users, 
or governors as their framework. 
Project (Entwurf) 
Entwurf (project or casting) is a key concept of 
Heideggerian philosophy which represents the way 
of being of Dasein (there-being), that is, being cast 
in history and casting or projecting self for the 
future at the same time. Entwurf has a number of 
meanings such as project, casting, designing, or 
planning. Using this concept as a metaphor, Capurro 
emphasizes that projecting or casting our “selves” 
are inseparable, and concerning not only computer 
programming, but also the development of the 
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whole world of information. The relationship be-
tween the practice of living and information (tech-
nology) creates ethos in the information society. 
Projecting “self” is at the same time projecting one’s 
relationship with others, and, in that sense, project-
ing to the world. This projection provides the back-
ground of the next understanding. Therefore, this 
concept is an indispensable factor of hermeneutic 
circulation and is strongly connected to the “pre-
understanding” that is already shown. 
Information Gestell (Informations-Gestell) 
“Gestell” is also a technical term of Heideggerian 
philosophy (especially concerning technologies) 
which represents modern technologies as an 
autonomous system having an axis of usefulness 
that affects human beings. Capurro thinks that 
information technology also has this structure of 
“Gestell.” When we see information technology, in 
the Heideggerian meaning, not as things (Vorhan-
densein) but as tools (Zuhandensein), and informa-
tion and its technology are seen in the context of 
our lives, then we can also see the opposite situa-
tion where we are driven by them.  
We can see that Capurro has tried to apply these 
hermeneutic ideas to information studies since his 
early study concerning the “hermeneutics of infor-
mation retrieval.” (Capurro 1986) In this study, his 
hermeneutic model of information retrieval is shown 
in contrast with traditional models of “rational” 
information behavior. According to Capurro, infor-
mation retrieval is not a “right” access to the “ra-
tionally” organized system of information as “objec-
tive” knowledge. Information systems themselves 
reflect pre-understandings of developers or situa-
tions surrounding them, and users or searchers get 
information or meanings casting their pre-
understandings into systems. We can see these 
movements as hermeneutic processes. Although 
classifications in libraries or thesauri in databases 
may look like closed systems, actually they reflect 
pre-understandings or horizons of meanings based 
on various activities in the outer world and have 
various characteristics in different times and spaces. 
This hermeneutic analysis on information retrieval is 
the starting point of Capurro’s hermeneutic ap-
proach to information studies. 
After that, the scope of his study went beyond the 
framework of information retrieval. From a herme-
neutic viewpoint, he addresses the overall relation-
ship between information and human lives, an 
informatic view of human beings, current issues 
concerning the information society, and information 
ethics in a wider meaning. It is in these studies 
where “ethos” or the intertwining of information 
technology and practices of our lives, as I men-
tioned above, is discussed as an important problem, 
and the hermeneutic turn of informatics becomes 
clear. It is not likely that computer hardware, soft-
ware, or any kind of information media and its 
contents are created by those who are “inde-
pendent” from their own lives in society or commu-
nities. In fact, the meanings or ways of being of 
information and its technology in society or commu-
nities are determined ontologically based on hori-
zons consisting of their pre-understandings. Fur-
thermore, these pre-understandings are by no 
means personal, but co-operational behaviors with 
others in “a” shared world. Therefore, they have 
ethical problems at the same time.  
To view information and its technology from the 
perspectives of the relationships in our lives, 
Capurro returns to Aristotelian thought (according to 
Heidegger). Capurro follows Aristotelian characteri-
zation between techne (technical knowledge) con-
cerning poiesis (production) and phronesis (practical 
knowledge) concerning praxis (practice). The former 
is based on the latter. Techne is partial knowledge 
concerning fragmentary technical acts of poiesis, 
while phronesis means knowledge concerning prac-
tical relationships. Poiesis or techne have specific 
meanings only when they are related to praxis. This 
praxis is exactly what Capurro thinks as the holistic 
image of our lives. He associates phronesis with the 
concept of “foreseeing (Vor-Sicht)” which Heidegger 
pointed out as one of the factors of the “pre-
structure of understanding” (Vor-Struktur des Ver-
stehens). Capurro regards phronesis as the central 
virtue in technical acts. It is an ability to see through 
the relationships of meanings, that is, the insepara-
ble, interactive, and tight relationships between 
information technology and human lives, the “outer” 
and “inner” world, theories and practices, science 
and technology, and self and others. Whether we 
are aware of it or not, we always have some kind of 
outlook on certain plural relationships of meanings 
in our holistic human lives. Through practice, fore-
sight is put into hermeneutic circulation, which leads 
to a new understanding or way of seeing. In this 
process, fixed statements or casuistic norms which 
provide problems and solutions in advance have 
slight significance but do not have ultimate author-
ity. The plasticity or flexibility of human lives, in 
other words, the possibility of projection, provides 
the key to understanding Capurro’s hermeneutic ap-
proach. It is certain that “ethos” is formed by hu-
mane interaction of meanings, involvement, and 
discretion through interpretation and response.  
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This interpretation is also similar to that of Hubert L. 
Dreyfus, who discusses information technology from 
a Heideggerian viewpoint and who mentions the 
Aristotelian concept of phronesis. In some regards 
Dreyfus and Capurro have very similar positions, but 
they are different from each other in subtle but 
important perspectives. One reason for the differ-
ence is that Dreyfus developed his study concerning 
issues on the nature of being of artificial intelligence 
or robotics while Capurro first started his study on 
information retrieval, that is, human behavior itself. 
Dreyfus emphasizes the nature of information as 
tools based on the first half of Heidegger’s “Time 
and Being”. Capurro also discusses that point, but 
he emphasizes the hermeneutic structure of pre-
understandings, mentioning the fact that informa-
tion and its technology are essential components for 
us to form our lives.  
In addition, Dreyfus concludes that it is impossible 
for us to make self realizations in cyberspace, for 
the totality of relationships in our lives is lost there 
because of the lack of corporeality. Whereas Drefus 
set information technology against the life-world 
and supposes a “pure” humane or fundamental 
world which has not been invaded by information 
media, Capurro thinks that information technology is 
“already embedded” in our life-world. In other 
words, Capurro thinks the life-world is the world 
which is variously characterized by information 
technology and media. The life-world seen as such 
can and should be always newly designed by both 
personal existential and information technological 
designing. 
Development of “Angeletics” 
Capurro has developed his hermeneutic approach 
and presented a new theoretical framework called 
“angeletics.” As the concept of “information” is quite 
ambiguous, he has turned his eyes to the concept of 
“message” in order to concentrate on the aspect of 
“transmission of meaning” and has tried to describe 
the structures and developments of various message 
phenomena in history. He named this particular 
study concerning message phenomena “angeletics” 
or “Angeletik”, derived from the Greek word angelía 
which means message. 
In developing angeletics, Capurro tries to comple-
ment the hermeneutic approach. Hermeneutics 
theorizes pre-understandings or horizons of mean-
ings and analyzes them. However, it does not deal 
with how they were originally generated or formed. 
Moreover, hermeneutics addresses interpretation of 
“something transmitted,” but does not address 
“transmitting.” Angeletics is considered to be a 
comprehensive framework in which the mecha-
nisms of generation, formation, sharing, or transmit-
ting of these pre-understandings or horizons of 
meanings are discussed.  
To describe generation or transmission of messages 
in history, it is necessary to see how the horizons of 
meanings or pre-understandings have been formed 
from a historical viewpoint.  
Capurro says that message transmission has two 
types of structure referred to as “dialogical” and 
“discursive” in the communicology of Flusser. The 
former is a structure where new messages are 
produced, and the latter is one that becomes clear 
when (new) messages are spread. Capurro regards 
the former structure as “horizontal = interactive” 
and the latter as “vertical = one way.” The expres-
sion of “vertical” implies the image that messages 
are transmitted from top to bottom with authority or 
power. Capurro points out the dialectic relationship 
woven by these horizontal and vertical structures in 
(western) history. He takes up three eras as model 
cases. 
The first case is ancient Greece. In the pre-Socrates 
era, the vertical structure of message transmission, 
by which gods make their intents known to humans, 
was dominant. The messengers who delivered the 
gods’ messages to humans were poets or oracles. 
Such structure of messages was determined by 
religious and political authorities and constituted the 
core of society. In addition to this vertical structure 
of messages, a horizontal one was developed 
through the dialogical culture of sophists and the 
philosophies of Socrates and Plato. As such, the 
vertical structure of messages took the place of the 
horizontal one. But this does not mean that the 
vertical one disappeared completely.  
The second case is the Age of Enlightenment. For a 
long time after the collapse of the Roman Empire, 
Christianity was located in the core of western 
message culture, that is, the dominant vertical 
message structure based on the connection be-
tween religion and political power. In the Age of 
Enlightenment, the dialectical relationship between 
vertical and horizontal structures appears again, 
being different from that of ancient Greece. Capurro 
thinks that the vertical structure of messages in this 
era was based on orders or norms characterized by 
churches and civil society. Those were given condi-
tions. On the other hand, he thinks that communica-
tions among researchers through publications al-
lowed the horizontal message structure to gain 
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power. This view of publishing technology as an 
apparatus to enable the horizontal interaction of 
messages and to assure the freedom of thought 
beyond the level of earthly human relationships is 
along the lines of Kant’s views as shown in “An 
Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” or 
“What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thought?” 
The third case is in the age of electronic media, that 
is, the modern times. Mass media, which Harbermas 
criticizes as possessing a one-way character, is 
regarded as the basis of the vertical message struc-
ture. The Internet, on the other hand, is regarded 
as a new infrastructure which enables us to com-
municate horizontally. The Internet provides all 
kinds of message transmission: One to one, one to 
many, many to one and many to many. This is a 
rather unique situation in history; therefore it is 
worth analyzing from the viewpoint of the “message 
society.” This horizontal message structure in the 
Internet Age is one of the main targets of angelet-
ics. Even if the Internet weakens the dominance of 
the vertical structure of mass media to some extent, 
it will continue to have crucial influence on our daily 
lives. This struggle for power is also the theme of 
angeletics. 
When it comes to historical approaches to “trans-
mission” phenomena, Régis Debray’s work on me-
diology may be a useful starting point. Debray 
developed his mediology by adapting Marxism to 
“media” studies but in a wider context. He analyzes 
the mechanisms of the organization of authority 
structures in transmission phenomena, using the 
contributing factors of realization or extension of 
influences of political movements (French Revolu-
tion and socialism) or religious doctrines (Trini-
tarianism of Christianity) as model cases. In mediol-
ogy, however, “communication” as a horizontal 
process is not regarded as important for the self 
realization of such thoughts or movement, and 
“transmission” is at all points determined by authori-
ties or powers; that is, regarded as top-down con-
struction (in Capurro’s words, “vertical” construc-
tion). Debray emphasizes that organizing material 
factors brings about the development of specific 
thoughts: In the case of Christianity, for example, 
“church buildings” functioned as a means of accept-
ing the words of God and “Communion bread” made 
them accept the Incarnation. 
Debray tends to regard material things as apparatus 
of transmission, but ignores emergent factors in 
each transmission. Although the roles of material 
things in the transmission of meanings are impor-
tant, it is not true that transmission is determined 
only by factors in the “outer” world such as material 
apparatus or social organizations. It is better to 
think that such factors influence some kinds of 
meaning transmission only when they are located in 
specific contexts of “inner” worlds or given mean-
ings shared in communities or society. Even if there 
were the same material apparatus, there must be 
other possibilities of meaning transmission according 
to “ethos” or pre-understandings. This is one of the 
most important differences between angeletics and 
mediology: The former considers message phe-
nomena not only on the level of material or “outer” 
factors, but also of subjective or “inner” factors. In 
other words, it is one of the main tasks of angeletics 
to investigate how horizons of meanings (“ethos” or 
shared pre-understandings) themselves are formed 
and how such subjective factors give meaning to 
material factors in message or meaning trans-
mission. To put it more directly, mediological studies 
can be seen as a part of angeletics in a sense be-
cause all kinds of messages, senders, mediators, 
and receivers are in the scope of angeletics while 
only “media” are regarded as producers of transmis-
sion in mediology. In other words, angeletics is an 
idea that comprehends mediological viewpoints. 
Hermeneutics, angeletics, and mediology are com-
plementary to one another in studies on human 
interaction. Both angeletics and mediology treat the 
aspect of “transmission” from a wide perspective 
that is not covered by hermeneutics. Mediology 
concentrates on “outer” factors such as social or-
ganization or material media rather than the genera-
tion of meaning or ideology. Angeletics emphasizes 
“inner” factors such as pre-understandings or hori-
zons of meanings, which are common to hermeneu-
tics, and investigates various aspects of “ethos” by 
considering the roles or relationships of senders, 
mediators, and receivers. Capurro tries to theorize 
angeletics based on Heidegger’s “pre-structure of 
understanding.” This means that message is consid-
ered to have ontological character and therefore a 
relationship with the world of human existence.  
Capurro thinks that “angeletic turn” comes after 
“hermeneutic turn.” This is a trial to extend the 
range of the hermeneutic approach in informatics to 
generation and the transmission of meanings taking 
over its fruitful outcome. The construction of ange-
letics has just started, and Capurro expects our 
coming contributions to develop this field of study. 
Ethics in the Information Age 
What does Capurro think ethics in the information 
age should be? He discusses this question by refer-
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ring to Foucault’s idea of “technologies of the self.” 
Foucault distinguishes among four types of tech-
nologies: of producing, of symbolization, of govern-
ing and of the self. Whereas the former three are 
related to “act-oriented” ethics or “norms,” only the 
last one is related to “self-oriented” ethics or 
“forms” of our lives in which we exactly face our 
own “selves”. As I mentioned at the beginning of 
this article, mainstream studies on information 
ethics so far have dwelt on problems such as mor-
als, regulations, norms or standards. These are 
apparently “act-oriented” ethics, and Capurro thinks 
that they do not make up a sufficient condition for 
us to live well in the information age. Since informa-
tion and information technology is directly related to 
the formation of our lives, it is quite important for us 
to reflect upon self-oriented ethics, to think from 
“inside” ourselves with regard to matters of informa-
tion ethics, rather than establish norms from “out-
side.”  
In this case, however, the “self” does not mean 
“ego.” Whereas “ego” is a capsule-like, isolated 
consciousness which does not include others, the 
“self” is “I as we and we as I”, which makes a 
relationship with others sharing a common environ-
ment. Construction of living with others like this is 
what Capurro calls “self-formation (Selbstformung),” 
and ethics on that level is undoubtedly self oriented.  
The self-oriented ethics that Capurro proposes has 
four characteristics as follows: 
Cooperation toward others 
The concept of “technologies of the self” as inter-
preted by Capurro is a slightly different from that of 
Foucault. While Foucault treats the formation of 
ethical selves as self oppression toward specific 
models in history, Capurro emphasizes positive self-
projection (Selbstformung) to create relationships 
with others, especially those from whom we are 
alienated or those whom we can recognize only 
through information media. “We are exposed to the 
place where we can form – and sometimes destroy 
– our lives not only with others but also for oth-
ers.”(Capurro 1995: 44) As I already mentioned, 
Capurro doesn’t think that “ethical problems can be 
solved by codes or prescriptions, at least when they 
are not understood as beginnings of the discussion. 
Reflections on ethics themselves can and should 
produce a new “ethos” in the mid and long 
term.”(Capurro 1999) 
Open relativism 
Capurro has doubts about attempts to develop 
“universal” information ethics codes by the United 
Nations or such organizations. Although the Internet 
has brought us universal access that overreaches 
borders, every country has relatively different cul-
tural bases, so a single code or set of norms con-
cerning information ethics will not be accepted by all 
of them. In Germany, for example, it is forbidden to 
make public information to support Nazism, but it is 
not possible to control the information found on 
websites of other countries. It is the same in the 
case of the influx of pornography to Islamic coun-
tries. In some countries it is restricted or forbidden 
to use the Internet. These problems cannot be 
solved at once by developing a “universal” code. 
Concerning information ethics it seems impossible to 
find a dogmatic criterion or a universal system. 
Rather it is important for us to create ways to use 
information and its technology to maintain relativity, 
following each culture or way of living. At the same 
time, however, we should avoid allowing relativism 
to become dogmatic, exclusive, or uncommunica-
tive. Relativity with room for having dialogues with 
other systems is desirable. 
Plural perspective 
To see plural relationships means to reject reduc-
tionism, that is, to reduce everything to a single 
relationship. Human beings are reduced – or even 
taken apart – in the process of oxidization by biolo-
gism, to the system of stimulus-response by psy-
chologism or to social elements by sociologism. 
Likewise informatism reduces or takes apart every-
thing (of course including human beings) to a single 
relation where even our spirits or ethos are re-
garded as mere information processing. Informatism 
leads to information technology-centered ideas 
where humans are driven to acquire more and more 
information (mainly computer) skills to be excellent 
homo informaticus, while those who have poor 
information skills are looked down upon. These 
reductionisms ultimately eliminate and ignore our 
life-world consisting of humane meanings.” The 
hermeneutic approach including participation by the 
“self” is completely opposed to these reductionisms. 
Ecological thinking 
According to Capurro, “one answer to the destruc-
tion of human life brought by the information soci-
ety is, as is also the case with the destruction of 
nature, the ecology of information and communica-
tion” (Capurro 1995: 40). He also states, “Technolo-
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gies of living mean to learn technologies concerning 
fulfilling our lives. Insofar as technologies of living 
are regarded as ecological ones, they are related to 
ideas transcending individuals” (Capurro 1995: 44). 
“Ecological thinking” means the pursuit of harmony 
as a whole. That is, being rampant with uncondi-
tional freedom of desires informed by a kind of 
postmodernist thought is regarded as an undesirable 
situation. Capurro presented his paper “Towards an 
Information Ecology” in 1990, where we can see 
that he had a basis in ecological thinking in the early 
years of his conception of information ethics. Eco-
logical thinking also means to avoid “humanism” in 
the sense of Heideggerians, or human-centered-
thinking. Capurro thinks that we should not sub-
scribe to technological determinism but humane 
thinking, but this does not mean human-centered 
thinking in utilizing the environment with our partial 
and imperfect knowledge. Furthermore, in this kind 
of ecology concerning information environment, 
attentions are paid to pathological phenomena 
which appear in the intertwining between human 
lives and information technology. For example, 
Capurro mentions the problem of speeding, suggest-
ing that we should consider not only the way the 
Internet is used to pursue efficiency or speed up our 
lives, driving us more and making us busier than 
now, but to get more spare time. He is also worried 
about the increasing number of children among 
heavy Internet users who lack concentration, are 
emotionally instable, or who are not good at human 
relationships. These topics can be regarded as the 
problems of human ecological systems from the 
viewpoint of ecological thinking.  
We can see that Capurro tries to open up a third 
dimension which has neither a modern nor post-
modern approach to information studies. Mentioning 
Aristotle, he tries to go back to the viewpoint where 
the confrontation between modernism and post-
modernism or the separation between academic 
studies and technologies did not occur. Studies 
concerning information ethics or the information 
society tend to polarize into modernism (information 
democracy) and postmodernism (spiritual anar-
chism) which do not seem to provide us with ade-
quate explanations. We can find few arguments that 
try to go beyond modernism and postmodernism to 
construct a new theoretical framework of informa-
tion ethics. In that sense, Capurro’s hermeneutic 
approach can be regarded as a pioneering work, 
giving us important suggestions to consider in the 
future development of information ethics. 
Capurro and Japanese 
Perspective 
Finally, I would like to briefly discuss the rela-
tionship between Capurro’s hermeneutic approach 
and the Japanese perspective.  
Capurro is interested in (ontological) distinctions 
between mono and koto, or between “reality (Re-
alität)” and “actuality (Wirklichkeit)” as proposed by 
Bin Kimura (1931- ), a noted Japanese psychoana-
lyst and a thinker. Mono and koto are concepts of 
Japanese language which mean “things” and 
“events”, respectively. Kimura relates the word 
“reality” to the “essence” of something and “actual-
ity” to what is “happening”. He mentions that in 
Japanese they use mono and koto, where mono 
refers to things in there being while koto refers to 
what is happening. The world is the whole of what 
is happening, not of the things. Also the existences 
or activities of “I” and “you” are not mono but koto, 
that is, they are not “substances” in Japanese. 
Capurro thinks this is important for our thinking 
about the question of what he calls “information 
metaphysics” vs. “information ontology,” the conflict 
between information-as-thing (Michael Buckland’s 
term) and information-as-event (Capurro’s concept 
to denote the “eventuality” in Heideggerian terms of 
the phenomenon), or between information as mono 
and as koto. Capurro says that Heidegger's criticism 
of the “Gestell” and what he calls the “Information 
Gestell” would look only to information as mono 
(things), but this is exactly what the book culture 
was. Libraries are full of mono. What the Internet 
brings is information as koto (events) and this is the 
main thought concerning “message”, because a 
message is basically koto. It makes no sense to 
think of messages as “things” with some “char-
acteristics.” I agree with Capurro when he says that 
messages are basically koto. The concept of infor-
mation is particularly problematic, and this is why he 
thinks that we must switch to the concept of “mes-
sage” which is more dynamic.  
It is natural that Kimura has a similar viewpoint of 
the hermeneutic approach because his work is 
based on Heidegger. On the other hand, Kimura 
also depends on the philosophy of Kitaro Nishida 
(1870-1945), who is called the first “philosopher” in 
Japan. Nishida himself practiced Zen and tried to 
systematize the eastern thought in terms of the 
western philosophy to overcome the separation 
between subjectivity and objectivity. Capurro him-
self has deepened his interest in Zen Buddhism and 
Japanese thought (e.g. Capurro 1999b, c) and 
promoted friendships with Japanese thinkers.  
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The future relationship between Capurro’s herme-
neutic approach and Japanese thought will be 
interesting. The interaction between them is ex-
pected to bear fruitful outcomes in the development 
of information ethics. 
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